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ABSTRACT 
The United States Army has struggled to institutionalize counterinsurgency 
operations in the Global War on Terror. The Army’s reward system, which drives 
individual motivation and reflects corporate values, plays a much overlooked role in this 
struggle. Within the Army, indeed within most organizations, pay, promotion, and awards 
form the tripod of extrinsic motivation, and represent tools the organization can use to 
reward specific behavior. Today and for the foreseeable future, both pay and promotion 
will have limited effects promoting counterinsurgency behavior. The Army’s award 
system, which proudly traces its history to George Washington, was not developed as a 
complete system until World War I and, in many respects, ceased development after 
World War II. The current ‘Pyramid of Honor,’ which focuses on valorous acts, is deeply 
engrained in Army culture. At the same time significant work and thought have gone into 
revising the Army’s ‘capstone’ manuals, FM-1 and FM-3.0. These documents, along with 
a separate manual on counterinsurgency, all revised or created since 9/11, attempt to 
move the Army in a new direction. 
This thesis explains the paradox that results. The Army has reached a point where 
it is telling its soldiers to do one type of action: work by, with, and through the host 
nation. Yet, it disproportionally delivers awards to those who conduct a separate type of 
action: engaging and killing the enemy. 
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Whether dealing with monkeys, rats or humans, it is hardly controversial 
to state that most organisms seek information concerning what activities 
are rewarded, and then seek to do (or at least pretend to do) those things, 
often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded, but neither operant 
nor expectancy theorists would quarrel with the essence of this notion. 
Nevertheless, numerous examples exist of reward systems that are fouled 
up in that the types of behavior rewarded are those which the rewarder is 
trying to discourage, while the behavior desired is not being rewarded at 
all.1 
Virgil begins his poem, The Aeneid with, “I sing of arms and a man.”2 It would 
seem that the greatest honor a soldier fighting in some of humanities’ earliest recorded 
battles could receive was to be remembered and immortalized in song.  
Modern soldiers are recognized and rewarded for their achievements, not by song 
or poem, but by a more formalized system of small medals and ribbons. For members of 
the United States Army, indeed for members of most modern professional armies, these 
symbols are worn on the uniform over one’s chest and display an individual’s success as 
a soldier. Each ribbon or medal speaks to an episode or chapter in the individual’s service 
record. Although the colorful collage on a uniform may have little meaning to most 
civilians, to members of the Army and others in the uniformed services, the significance 
of awards are profound, tracing their heritage all the way back to George Washington and 
the early Continental Army.  
The Army officially describes its awards program as follows: “The goal of the 
total Army awards program is to foster mission accomplishment by recognizing 
excellence of both military and civilian members of the force and motivating them to 
                                                 
1 Steven Kerr, “On the Folly of Rewarding A, while Hoping for B,” Academy of Management 
Executive 9, no. 1 (1995): 7. 
2 Publius M. Vergilius, The Aeneid, trans., J. W. Mackail (New York: Random House, 1950), 1. 
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high levels of performance and service.”3 As described, awards serve as a motivational 
tool for soldiers. These tools are organized into a ‘Pyramid of Honor’ that was developed 
and refined during the United States’ involvement in WWI and WWII. Although new 
awards have been added since WWII, the basic structure into which they fit has remained 
unchanged. This system of awards, which was successful in rewarding the actions needed 
in high intensity, state-on-state warfare, may not be suitable for the current conflicts or 
those to come.  
Since shortly after September 11, 2001, the Army has been actively fighting in 
Afghanistan, adding another front in Iraq in 2003. These conflicts have been given 
various labels, from the Global War on Terror to the Long War and, more recently, 
Overseas Contingency Operations. Regardless of what these conflicts are called, and one 
reason no one knows exactly what to call them, is that they comprise something vastly 
different from the large-scale, interstate, conventional wars for which the Defense 
Department has prepared. As LTC Paul Yingling stated in a recent speech, “The world 
has changed a great deal in the last fifty years, but the Department of Defense has not. 
Despite some remarkable accomplishments by those parts of DoD closest to the 
battlefield, especially those in Iraq, the institutional military has proven incapable of 
internal reform on the scale necessary to provide for our security.”4  
This thesis, which focuses specifically on the Army Awards system, seeks to 
answer the following questions: Could the Army’s Awards system inadvertently be 
hindering counterinsurgency operations? In other words, are soldiers who are supposed to 
do B, namely engage in counterinsurgency best practices, receiving commensurate 
awards? Or does the focus remain on A, the actions needed to succeed in large-scale 
state-on-state warfare?  
To answer these questions, the thesis is divided into the following sections. 
                                                 
3 Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, “Army Regulation 600-8-2,” Military Awards (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, January 11, 2007), 1. 
4 Paul Yingling, Speech to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 2, 2009. 
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Chapter II provides an overview of the reward system, to include a brief review of 
the relevant literature. The chapter differentiates between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. 
It also discusses the two other types of rewards soldiers earn: money and promotion to a 
higher rank, and it briefly examines some of the challenges that monetary and 
promotional rewards pose in the current environment. 
Chapter III’s focus is the Army’s Awards system. This system, with ancient roots, 
traces its beginnings to the United States Army in 1782, when General George 
Washington devised two badges of distinction for enlisted men and noncommissioned 
officers. These early awards were barely used and quickly forgotten, and in the early 
years and wars of the U.S., the system was seldom needed. Instead, promotions on the 
field were the reward a soldier might expect for a display of valor.  
This changed with U.S. involvement in World War I. The number of decorations 
went from two, as the ‘Great War’ began, to the current number, which, counting skill 
badges, is over 100. Chapter III pays special attention to the Bronze Star, Silver Star, and 
Distinguished Service Cross, which are the 4th, 3rd and 2nd highest combat awards behind 
the Medal of Honor. Also examined are award trends, with particular focus on Iraq 
through five years of war. Several examples are given of how ingrained awards are in the 
Army’s daily life.  
Chapter IV explores both the academic and doctrinal literature, describing the 
‘best practices’ for conducting counterinsurgency (COIN). It also analyzes the changes in 
policy the Obama administration has initiated toward Iraq and Afghanistan, along with a 
brief description of the budgetary changes introduced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. 
Chapter V focuses on analyzing three databases and responses from a 
convenience sample of NPS students. I examined citations of Silver Star recipients and 
the descriptions of the recipients’ action as presented by the Department of the Army and 
the Department of Defense public web pages. Both of these forums have a ‘heroes’ 
section which highlights individuals, the award they earned, and describes the 
circumstances involved. Examining who is awarded which medal for what type of action  
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can be taken to reflect what is the Department of the Army’s and Department of 
Defense’s conception of the ‘ideal’. The question I pose in using this data is does this 
‘ideal’ match the type of actions desired in COIN?  
Chapter VI contains conclusions, recommendations, and areas for further study. 
The appendices include a multitude of further details. 
A few notes on methods: There is ample data available from Army sources on the 
number and type of awards received in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Information on exactly 
when the award was earned is a little less clear. Sometimes the best guess that can be 
made is only within a 4-month period. As to why the award was given, this is something 
that is impossible to tease out using just official Army figures. To answer that question, I 
read hundreds of different citations and descriptions of the events surrounding the 
incident, and then coded these into a database. Examples of the type of data I drew from 
are contained in Appendices P, Q, and R. 
A final note: this thesis is not being written out of any sense of personal grievance 
towards the Army Awards system. Nothing is further from the truth. In January 2007, 
while serving as a company commander, my unit was involved in a vicious battle with a 
Shiite cult north of the city of Najaf. As a result of the actions that occurred that day, I 
was awarded the Silver Star, and the men under my command earned over 70 valor 
decorations. Only when I began to study Irregular Warfare as a graduate student was I 
struck by the contrasting messages between what policy and doctrine want soldiers to do 
and what soldiers are rewarded for doing. This drove me to ask the questions that form 
the basis for this thesis. 
 5 
II. ON INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC REWARDS 
A cursory look inside most organizations reveals an array of tools used to elicit 
and to direct desired behavior. Carol Sansone writes, “Unarguably, our age is the age of 
rewards. The regulation of behavior by consciously constructed and socially imposed 
reward contingencies, whether blatant or subtle, is ubiquitous within contemporary 
Western oriented societies.”5 What makes people behave in certain ways, and how 
organizations can modify and control this behavior, are subjects of long standing 
interest.6  
The U.S. Army, a very large organization, depends on its soldiers to have the 
drive or motivation to accomplish goals important to the entity as a whole. Generally, 
motivation is divided into two parts: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic motivation is 
defined as, “Occurring when an activity satisfies basic human needs for competence and 
control which makes the activity interesting and likely to be performed for its own sake 
rather than as a means to an end.”7 
This sort of motivation is decisive to the military, where intrinsic motivation is 
based on military service and is embodied in the core value of ‘selfless service.’8 Some of 
this motivation is captured by members of the Spencer family, five brothers all serving in 
the U.S. military: “I can remember going to a Fourth of July parade growing up and 
seeing the local color guard march by. I felt it was the neatest thing in the world and I 
                                                 
5 Carol Sansone and Judith M. Harackiewicz, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motovation (San Diego: 
Academic Press, 2000), 15. 
6 From Skinner’s Box to Dr. Steven Kerr, there has long been academic interest in why people (and 
animals) act in certain ways. 
7 Sansone and Harackiewicz, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motovation, 444. This is arguably moving beyond 
intrinsic task motivation to normative affective motivation. My point here is not to delve deeply into 
different types of intrinsic motivation, just to note it exists and is a strong force. 
8 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 1 The Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2005), 1-16. It is further defined: Put the welfare of the Nation, the Army, and subordinates before your 
own. 
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wanted to be a part of it,” “We always had the drive to serve our country,” “I didn’t do it 
because my brothers did it. It was more for a love of country and to just do my part.”9 
The other side of the motivation coin is extrinsic motivation, defined as 
motivation “based on something external to the activity or external to the person.”10 
Within the Army, the main external motivations appear to be pay, promotion and 
awards.11 These three rewards then become the tools that the Army can use to modify 
behavior. Figure 1 graphically depicts the relationship between the main, intrinsic 




Figure 1.   The Intrinsic Motivation Pedestal and Three Extrinsic Motivation Guy-
Wires 
 
                                                 
9 Jason Watkins, “Why We Serve, 5 Spencer Brothers Serve across 3 Military Branches,” Army Times 
(May 4, 2009): 8. 
10 Carol Sansone and Judith M. Harackiewicz, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motovation (San Diego: 
Academic Press, 2000), 445. 
11 There are certainly other extrinsic awards: educational benefits, access to health care, a defined 
pension plan and access to housing, to name a few. This study, however, focuses on the ‘Big Three.’ 
 7 
As Erik Jansen explains: 
The reward system functions to create goal congruence between the 
individual and the organization. Individuals selected into organizations 
have different values and valences for rewards and outcomes. The reward 
system functions to induce diverse individuals to contribute to the 
organization through the management of rewarding and aversive 
consequences. It functions to motivate individual and collaborative 
performances.12  
A. THE ARMY PAY SYSTEM 
The amount of dollars spent on pay for soldiers by the Army is huge. According 
to How the Army Runs, “Over one third of the Army’s total obligation authority relates to 
compensation and only through controlling the cost drivers can the Army manage the 
dollars appropriated by the Congress.”13 Appendix A depicts the basic pay chart for 
2009. A glance at Table 1 shows that a soldier receives monetary compensation based 
upon first, rank, and then the time served. There is a monetary incentive to continue to be 
promoted. However, after a certain amount of time in any rank, there ceases to be any 
additional pay for longevity of service. 
 
Enlisted Officer 
Grade Year Grade Year 
E-1 2 O-1 3 
E-2 2 O-2 6 
E-3 3 O-3 14 
E-4 6 O-4 18 
E-5 12 O-5 22 
E-6 18 O-6 26 
E-7 26   
E-8 30   
E-9 38   
Table 1.   Pay Explanation: The Year Indicates the Time a Soldier Serve in Each Rank 
before a Cap on Pay is Established 
                                                 
12 Erik Jansen, Toward a Strategic Reward System Perspective (PhD diss., University of Southern 
California, Unpublished, 1986), 20. 
13 U.S. Army War College, How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2007-2008, 
26th ed. (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 2007), 303. 
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Within the base pay, there is no relationship to how well or poorly a task is completed. 
Nor does the base pay reflect any special skills a soldier may possess.14 The point to be 
made is that pay is not directly related to performance. 
While serving in an area like Iraq or Afghanistan, a Service Member is entitled to 
a variety of different types of pay in addition to base bay. Table 2 shows the types and 
amount of these pays. Again, as with base pay, there is no linkage between performance 
and pay. For instance, a soldier who constantly moves in and interacts with the local 
population would earn no more money than another who never leaves a base.  
 
Family Separation Allowance (if 
married) $250 
Hardship Duty Pay $100 
Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay $225 
TDY $105 
Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (No 
federal income tax taken from pay) varies 
Table 2.   Additional Pay per Month Earned in Iraq or Afghanistan 
In sum, the Army (indeed the entire Department of Defense) has a well-
established pay system that provides motivation to service members. Service in a combat 
zone, which is recognized to be a more challenging environment, is rewarded with at 
least $670 additional dollars a month. However, the pay system is inflexible in the sense 
that it does not reward actions that are specifically desired and identified by the 
organization with additional pay.15 
B. PROMOTION TO A HIGHER RANK 
Promotion to a higher rank is another guy-wire of external motivation. The Army 
operates a closed system. To reach a higher rank in the organization, one must have 
served at a lower rank. For example, if a sudden need for more Majors arises, there is no 
mechanism to import them from outside the system. Figure 2 shows the shortages in 
                                                 
14 There is special incentive pay for medical specialties. See Appendix C for additional details. 
15 There is a detailed discussion in Chapter III on what is desirable in a counterinsurgency operation. 
 9 
Captains and Majors in FY 2007. Any gap between the vertical bars and the solid line 
indicates a shortfall between expected strength of a year group and the requirements 
expected to be filled by that year group.16 One of the effects of this gap is that a 
promotion system that, in the past, was competitive has ceased to be so. 
 
 
Figure 2.   FY 2007 Shortages of Officers by Year Group17 
 
                                                 
16 There are numerous studies and papers describing why there is a shortage: e.g., not enough 
accessions during the drawdown of forces, attrition because of the war, and expansion of the force 
structure, etc. For the purposes of this thesis, I am concerned about the effects this shortage has on the 
force, not its causes. 
17 Charles A. Henning, Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS, 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), 6. 
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The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) mandates a goal for 
Captain through Colonel. As Table 3 indicates, the Army was promoting slightly above 
its goals in 2001. Comparing 2005 to 2001, the jump in promotion rates is considerable, 
particularly through the rank of LTC.  
 
 
Table 3.   Promotion Opportunity: First Time Considered18 
Table 3 concerns itself with a broad population. In contrast, Figure 3 looks at one 
particular combat arms branch: Armor. This figure, which was included in a late 2008 
update by the branch to the field, displays even higher promotion rates. Particularly 





                                                 
18 Henning, Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress, 9. 
19 The author suspects the promotion rates for Armor officers are representative of the other combat 
arms branches.  
 11 
 
Figure 3.   Promotion Rates for Armor Officers20 
Consider what effect these promotion rates and this pyramid might have on a 
young or mid-career officer. In the past, promotion, especially to the rank of LTC, was 
most assuredly not a sure thing. Taking the jobs that were perceived to be the hardest and 
then excelling at them was the path that many young officers thought they needed to take 
in order to be promoted. Clearly, with promotion rates at or near 100%, the perception 
shifts from, “only the ‘best and brightest’ get promoted” to “I’ll be promoted so long as I 
pass the mirror test.”21  
Compounding the messages these promotion statistics convey is the feeling that 
senior officers did not even have to be particularly capable in the discharge of their duties 
                                                 
20 Armor Branch, U.S. Army, “Armor Branch Update October 2008,” U.S. Army Human Resources 
Command, Officer Personnel Management Directorate, October 2008, 
https://www.hrc.mil/site/protect/Active/oparmor/Armor_Webpage_2009/New_ArmorHomepage(09).htm 
(accessed Janruary 15, 2009), slide 17. 
21 This is a somewhat morbid expression that proposes that as long as you are alive and breathing (thus 
able to fog up the mirror) you will be promoted.  
 12 
to succeed in the system. According to Eliot Cohen (quoted in The Gamble), “Not all 
generals are up to the task…not a single general has been removed for ineffectiveness 
during the course of this war. The current promotion system does not take into account 
actual effectiveness in counterinsurgency. We need not great guys but effective guys. 
Routine promotion and assignment systems for generals in wartime is a disaster.”22 
The Army has identified advising Iraqi forces as a key task in paving the way to 
the successful withdrawal of U.S. forces. The next chapter discusses how advising and 
working ‘by, with, and through’ the host nation is critical to success in a 
counterinsurgency. Appendix B contains a copy of an email sent by the Army Chief of 
Staff to senior leaders stressing the importance of filling advisory (Military Transition 
Teams or MiTT) positions with quality officers. One imagines that, in the past, a soldier 
might have been motivated to seek this type of assignment by the prospect of promotion. 
But it now appears he will be promoted regardless of whether he takes the hard, vitally 
needed job or not, in which case what incentive is there for signing up for the more 
challenging and dangerous jobs?  
For policy makers thinking about rewarding Army officers, the question must be 
asked: if everyone is assured of being promoted, can promotion be used as a tool to 
reward specific behavior? 
C. AWARDS 
Pay and promotion are important in civilian and military organizations alike. 
However, the current methods of allocating pay and promotion in the military lessen their 
effects given the current environment. Consequently, awards may be the best tool the 
military has to reward the behavior it is seeking.  
In many regards, awards can be considered visible status symbols. Further 
chapters discuss awards in greater detail. Here it is important simply to recognize the 
                                                 
22 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 99-100. For an excellent article 
critiquing the senior leadership in Iraq, please see Paul Yingling, “A Failure in Generalship,” Armed Forces 
Journal (May 2007), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198 (accessed Janruary 20, 2009). 
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power this ‘third guy-wire’ has on individuals. Although the following passage was 
written several decades ago, it captures the power of status symbols such as awards: 
Again, there are facilities such as access to staff status and dining room 
facilities, payment by cheque, special uniform and markings on the 
uniform, admission to the membership of professional bodies, 
apprenticeship schemes, and the like. The author remembers a lad working 
very hard indeed, not for money but for a brass star in his cub’s hat, 
because that is what he valued at the time.23 
D. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN AWARDS AND ENLISTED 
PROMOTION  
The previous section reviewed officer promotions. Next, I want to discuss one set 
of connections between awards and promotions as they relate to junior enlisted and non-
commissioned officers.  
There are nine different enlisted ranks in the Army: E-1 (Private) through E-9 
(Sergeants Major). Promotion to E-2 through E-4 is based on time of service and time in 
grade. For example, promotion to E-2 takes place no sooner than six months into an 
individuals time in service; to E-3 requires 12 months time of service and four months 
service as an E-2.24 However, promotion to E-5, the entry-level position of the NCO 
corps, (as well as to E-6) is controlled by a semi-centralized system. Soldiers have to 
complete a promotion point worksheet, which results in a point total. A points list is 
released monthly. If a soldier’s point total is higher than that listed, he is promoted.25 The 
promotion point worksheet allocates points in three different areas: total performance and 
military training; administrative points; and board points.26 In the administrative points 
section, values are assigned to different awards as seen in Table 4. 
 
 
                                                 
23 E. W. Hughes, Human Relations in Management (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1970), 43. 
24 Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, Army Regulation 600-8-19 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Enlisted Promotons and Reductions), 12. 
25 Ibid., 16. 





Awards   Badges   
Soldier's Medal or higher award 35 Combat Infantry Badge 15 
Bronze Star Medal 30 Combat Field Medical Badge 15 
Purple Heart 30 Combat Action Badge 15 
Defense Meritorious Medal 25 Expert Infantry Badge 10 
Meritorious Service Medal 20 Expert Field Medical Badge 10 
Air Medal 20 Ranger Tab 10 
Joint service Commendation Medal 20 SF Tab 10 
Army Commendation Medal 20 Parachutist Badge 5 
Joint Service Achievement Medal 15 Air Assault Badge 5 
Army Achievement Medal 15   
Good Conduct Medal 10   
Table 4.   Points Awarded for Promotion Based on Awards 
Eight hundred points are possible on the promotion worksheet; up to 100 of these 
points can be earned by awards. These award points represent a maximum of 12.5% of 
the total. However, because the criteria are well defined and known, there is potential for 
a clever young soldier to game the system. It is not beyond reason that a soldier in Iraq or 
Afghanistan would consider action resulting in an award so as to improve his point total 
faster.27  
This linkage between awards and promotion provides a powerful incentive for a 
soldier, especially at the E-5 level, to seek action that, given the current point system, 
rewards combat over ‘meritorious service’.28 The resulting promotion points not only 
benefit the soldier in the short term, but his promotion signals to others what they should 
be doing. In other words, a point system, whose potential flaws have negligible impact in 
peacetime, can have a dramatic effect in times of conflict.  
                                                 
27 Chapter III goes into greater detail about how specific awards and entitlements can be earned. 
28 Chapter IV discusses the best practices in counterinsurgency.  
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III. AWARDS 
I challenge anyone to show me a republic, ancient or modern, in which 
there have not been decorations. Some people call them baubles. Well it is 
by means of baubles that one leads men. 
—Napoleon Bonaparte 
A. WHAT IS THE BIG DEAL ABOUT AWARDS? 
Peering into an organization as large as the Department of Defense and attempting 
to gain insight on a single topic is a daunting task. What makes awards important to 
members of the military? Within the Army, which has manuals for everything, only one 
Army Regulation of 188 pages is dedicated to military awards. In the previous chapter, 
the point was made that military awards are the ultimate status symbols within the 
community. The late Col. David Hackworth, a highly decorated Army Officer, describes 
awards this way: 
Soldiers and sailors, airmen and Marines prize awards for heroism even 
more than Olympic competitors cherish their gold medals…They are 
sacred, the ultimate symbol. They say you’ve been there, you’ve stood 
tall. At a glance, warriors can look at one another and determine exactly 
where and how well they have done their duty and how much they’ve 
bled. Medals are the military’s DNA chart. They command instant 
recognition and respect. Men and women die for valor awards.29 
The seemingly esoteric nature of military awards, and the ability of those within 
the service to know and distinguish what all the ‘symbols’ mean, is captured by Sidney 
Freedberg, a reporter for the National Journal:  
To a civilian, the ‘ribbon rack’ on a dress uniform is at once impressive 
and unintelligible, like poetry in a foreign language. To the discerning 
military eye, however, those decorations spell out a coded message with 
the wordless precision of signal flags. ‘You can have someone walk into a 
room in uniform and to a civilian he looks like Idi Amin, festooned with 
“fruit salad” everywhere,’ said Bruce Gundmundsson, a retired Marine 
major who is a military historian. ‘But the cognoscenti look at that and 
                                                 
29 David H. Hackworth, Hazardous Duty (New York: Perennial, 2001), 285-6. 
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say, “Aha, this guy has never seen a shot fired in anger.” Another guy 
might be wearing only a couple of decorations, but you look at those and 
go “Wow.”30  
Another way to measure the importance awards hold is to observe what has 
happened to individuals whose qualifications to wear certain awards have been called 
into question by others. The Navy’s highest ranking officer, for instance, responded by 
committing suicide: “Admiral Boorda, the Chief of Naval Operations, shot himself 
outside his home in Washington in May 1996 only hours before he was to be interviewed 
by reporters from Newsweek investigating whether he had earned the right to wear two 
tiny brass ‘V’ pins, which signify valor for having earned the medals in combat.”31  
The significance of military awards is also protected by law. Federal code 
provides for a penalty of up to one year in jail and/or a fine for unauthorized wearing of 
awards or making false statements about receiving them. A public official from southern 
California recently discovered this law the hard way: 
A subdued Xavier Alvarez, 50, who sits on the board of directors for the 
Three Valleys Municipal Water District in Claremont, admitted to 
violating the Stolen Valor Act, a recently enacted federal law that makes it 
a crime for a person to falsely claim he or she was awarded medals for 
service in the U.S. armed forces. Last fall, Alvarez became the first person 
to be charged for making this type of verbal misrepresentation. “We have 
to guard the honor of our nation's military heroes, and this prosecution was 
a small attempt to do that,” said Assistant U.S. Atty. Craig Missakian.32 
Clearly, military awards are sufficiently important to those in the military (and 
those who have retired from the military) that they be protected from abuse by society. 
Some history is needed to better understand precisely what awards mean to those who 
serve. 
                                                 
30 Sydney J. Freedberg, “The Other Three Thousand,” www.nationaljournal.com, Janruary 12, 2007, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20070113_4.php (accessed October 1, 2008), 4. 
31 Steven Lee Myers, “Admiral, a Suicide, Wins Some Vindication on Combat Awards,” New York 
Times, June 25, 1998, Late edition (East Coast) ed.: A15. 
32 Scott Glover, “Man Pleads Guilty to Lying about Medal,” Los Angeles Times, May 6, 2008: B10. 
 17 
B. HISTORY OF AWARDS 
1. Early History 
Napoleon, for instance, knew his history. The Roman Legions had a well-defined 
system of awards--from minor valor awards like the Torques, Amillae, or Phalerae given 
to the rank and file, to a series of crowns for significant achievements. In Caesar’s day, 
“A successful soldier was able to display spectacular decorations. These included collars 
or necklaces, arm-bands and round discs worn in a leather harness strung over the 
corselet…Open to all ranks, too, was the glorious Civic Crown, a wreath of oak-leaves 
awarded for saving the life of a fellow citizen.”33  
2. Creation of Awards in the U.S. Army 
In the U.S. Army, decorations date back to the end of the Revolutionary War.34 It 
was not until August 1782, almost a year after the victory at Yorktown, that Washington 
issued an order that read in part:  
The General, ever desirous to cherish a virtuous ambition in his soldiers, 
as well as to foster and encourage every species of military merit, directs 
that, whenever any singularly meritorious action is performed, the author 
of it shall be permitted to wear on his facings, over his left breast, the 
figure of a heart in purple cloth or silk, edged with narrow lace or binding. 
Not only instances of unusual gallantry, but also of extraordinary fidelity 
and essential service in any way, shall meet with a due reward…the road 
to glory in a patriot army and a free country is thus opened to all. This 
order is also to have retrospect to the earliest days of the war, and to be 
considered a permanent one.”35 
 
                                                 
33 Michael Grant, The Army of the Caesars (New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1974), xxii. 
34 The Continental Congress did award several gold medals to key leaders for their actions: 
Washington for service driving the British out of Boston, Gates for Saratoga, and Jones after the taking of 
the Serapis. Congress also awarded the Andre Medal to the three soldiers who captured Major John Andre 
with West Point’s defensive plans, given to him by Benedict Arnold.  
35 Frank Foster and Lawrence Borts, A Complete Guide to All United States Military Medals (Fountain 
Inn: MOA Press, 2005), 5. 
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Existing records still show that this first award went to three non-commissioned 
officers. In all likelihood, there were others, but the British destroyed the records 
detailing their names when they burned Washington D.C. during the war of 1812. The 
Purple Heart and Honorary Badge of Distinction thereafter fell into disuse.36 
3. American Revolution to WWI37 
Despite two major conflicts prior to the Civil War, the Army’s Awards system 
was not reestablished. Not until after the Civil War had started, was a new award, the 
Medal of Honor, brought into creation.38 President Lincoln approved the award on July 
12, 1862.39 During the Civil War, 1,198 Army Medals of Honor were awarded.40  
For years, the Medal of Honor was the only American military medal that the 
U.S. had.41 Once Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901, he initiated legislation 
to create medals to honor those who had served in previous conflicts. From this came a 
new category of American service Awards. By 1909, campaign medals had been 
developed to retroactively recognize veterans of the Civil War, Indian Wars, War with 
Spain, Philippine Insurrection and China Relief Expedition of 1900-1. With the creation 
of these medals began the tradition of wearing them on the tunic or jacket, which 
continues to this day.42 
As war clouds loomed in 1916, the Secretary of War established a panel of five 
Generals to review all 2,625 Medals of Honor presented by the Army up to that time. The 
result was that 911 medals, most awarded during the Civil War, were revoked. By 
                                                 
36 John White, “The Award No One Wants,” The New American (October 29, 2007): 34-38. 
37 For a listing of Decorations and Service Awards from the Revolution to WWI, see Appendix E. 
38 To be technically correct, there are three types of the Medal of Honor. The Army, Navy and Air 
Force each have their own unique physical version of the Medal.  
39 John E. Strandberg and Roger J. Bender, The Call of Duty: Military Awards and Decorations of the 
United States of America (San Jose: James Bender Publishing, 1994), 17. 
40 U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Military Awards Branch, “Statistics by Region, Conflict 
or Incident,” www.hrc.army.mil. April 22, 2009, 
https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/awards/STATS/Jan_07_MAB_Statistics_Conflict%2c_Opera
tion%2c_or_Incident.doc (accessed April 22, 2009), 1. 
41 The Certificate of Merit existed, but was just that, a paper certificate. 
42 Foster and Lawrence, A Complete Guide to All United States Military Medals, 6. 
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revoking these awards, many given for petty reasons, and by establishing much tougher 
criteria, the panel created a new problem—how to recognize the heroism and outstanding 
performance of military personnel who performed at levels somewhat below those that 
would justify being awarded the MOH.43  
4. Creation of the Modern System WWI through WWII44 
Little doubt exists that the two World Wars had a defining influence on the 
Army’s award system, especially with respect to decorations for valor, merit, and service. 
Consider that a soldier on the eve of WWI could earn the Medal of Honor, or nothing. In 
contrast, a soldier riding a liberty ship home from the Pacific theater in late 1945 could 
have earned a multitude of valor awards.  
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the World Wars on the Army’s award system. 
Not counting the decorations created by the Department of Defense after the Vietnam 
War, the near stagnation in the Army awards system should also be apparent.45 The two 
Army decorations added since WWII are the Meritorious Service Medal and the Army 




                                                 
43 For instance, a large number of Medals of Honor were given to soldiers who re-enlisted, while some 
20 were given the honor guard that accompanied President Lincoln’s body to its burial site; Peter Collier, 
Medal of Honor: Portraits of Valor beyond the Call of Duty (New York: Artisan, 2003), 238.  
44 For a listing of the Decorations and Service awards created from WWI through WWII, see 
Appendix F. 
45 The Department of Defense and Joint Service awards are excluded because they mirror existing 
Army awards. I excluded them because their purpose is to give the DoD and Joint Staff commanders the 
ability to present awards for merit without having to go through each service for approval. See Appendix I 
for more information. 
46 The MSM was established in 1969. This is not a combat decoration, but is the medal of choice for 
end of tour and retirement awards for field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers. 
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Figure 4.   Decorations for Valor or Merit (Excluding those DoD Awards Created after 
the Vietnam War) 
5. WWII to Present Day47 
While the number of decorations has remained static since WWII, the number of 
awards given for service has continued to rise, as seen in Figure 5. The contrast to the 
number of decorations is striking both in real terms and in terms of change over time.  
 
                                                 
47 Please see Appendix G for a list of Awards and Decorations created since WWII. 
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Figure 5.   Service Awards Authorized since their Creation in 1907 
C. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DECORATIONS, ENTITLEMENTS, 
AND BADGES48 
While the awards system has been called the ‘Pyramid of Honor,’ some degree of 
explanation is needed to fully understand its idiosyncrasies. There are, in effect, three 
smaller pyramids. One award pyramid (and the one that is most recognized) is for valor; a 
second is for merit and service; and the third consists of entitlements and badges. This 
can be confusing because some awards, such as the Bronze Star, can be earned for both 
valor and merit in combat. The V device distinguishes them, as soldiers learn to 
recognize.49  
Before Sgt. Stone earned one of each kind, he recalled, ‘I didn’t know 
there were two different types of Bronze Stars.’…But in Stone’s company 
of 140 troops, only two others were awarded the Bronze Star with 
V…‘We know the difference,’ said Army 1st Sgt. Gerald Wolford, a Silver 




                                                 
48 Please see Appendix H for a list of major badges and the dates they were created. 
49 Appendix J depicts these three pyramids. 
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OK, it doesn’t mean you did anything. Go home, tell your story, get your 
Bronze Star license plate, but just realize that my private who did not get 
anything, did more than you did.’50 
Entitlements and badges are given automatically to anyone who meets certain 
criteria. For example, the Purple Heart, awarded to wounded soldiers, is actually an 
entitlement. Consequently, a soldier who serves a year in Iraq may end up with several 
different awards. 
• A valor award like the Bronze Star Medal with V for a discreet action is 
given for being distinguished for heroic achievement and must have been 
recommended by the chain of command on a DA 638. Oftentimes, 
additional supporting documentation, such as sworn statements, must be 
provided. Approval authority in Iraq is usually the first Division level 
(Major General, O-8) commander.51 
• A service award, like the Army Commendation Medal, recognizes what 
the individual did throughout a deployment and must be recommended by 
the chain of command on a DA 638. Approval authority in Iraq for an 
ARCOM is usually the first Brigade level (Colonel O-6) commander. 
• A unit award, such as the Meritorious Unit Citation, does not reflect 
individual actions. The battalion or brigade staff writes up this type of 
award. No individual orders are cut if it is approved. Eventually, a blanket 
order is published authorizing any individual assigned to the unit during 
the specified dates to wear the award. 
• A service award, like the Iraq Campaign Medal, only requires that an 
individual show that he was assigned in-theater during qualifying periods 
to wear it. 
• An entitlement like the Combat Infantryman Badge or Combat Action 
Badge typically requires a sworn statement that must be provided to the 
approval authority (Brigade or Division level). 
                                                 
50 Sydney J. Freedberg, “The Other Three Thousand,” www.nationaljournal.com, Janruary 12, 2007, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20070113_4.php (accessed October 1, 2008), 5. 
51 Quick approval of posthumous awards was stopped after the debacle concerning Cpl. Pat Tillman’s 
Silver Star, which was awarded before the public revelation that he was killed by his own platoon. Added 
to AR 600-8-22 was “Posthumous valor awards must always reflect accurately the actual events and 
circumstances for which the award is being presented. Prior to taking any action on a posthumous valor 
award recommendation, the award approval authority must review the completed AR 15-6 collateral 
investigation, to ensure the accuracy of the award process. The approval authority must also indicate in 
block 26i, DA form 638 that the completed AR 15-6 investigation was reviewed.” 
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The takeaway from this is that the award system is fully invested in the conflict. 
Most soldiers who complete their first deployment will end up with at least an end of tour 
service award, like the ARCOM and an Iraq Campaign medal.  
D. SOME GREATER CONTEXT ON AWARDS 
1. Trends in Iraq 
A significant number of awards are being earned in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Looking specifically at valor awards, over 12,000 have been awarded for actions in both 
theaters. Table 5 shows the breakdown of total awards.52  
 
Global War on Terrorism Valor Awards 
Award Afghanistan Iraq Total 
Medal of Honor 0 2 2 
Distinguished Service Cross 3 16 19 
Silver Star 151 398 549 
Distinguished Flying Cross 90 102 192 
Soldier's Medal 28 104 132 
Bronze Star for Valor 1098 2167 3265 
Air Medal for Valor 673 609 1282 
ARCOM for Valor 2015 4788 6803 
Table 5.   Breakdown of Army Valor Awards Updated by Military Awards Branch, 22 
April 200953 
2. Comparison to Previous Conflicts 
To place the number of 12,000 in perspective, Table 6 compares the top three 
valor awards earned during five conflicts prior to the war in Iraq. There is no perfect way 
to make these comparisons. The DSC numbers from the World Wars are high because the 
Silver Star had not yet been introduced. A good way to compare the different levels of 
                                                 
52 For a breakdown of valor awards in Iraq over time, see Appendix L. 
53 U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Military Awards Branch, “Statistics by Region, Conflict 
or Incident,” www.hrc.army.mil, April 22, 2009, 
https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/Active/TAGD/awards/STATS/Jan_07_MAB_Statistics_Conflict%2c_Opera
tion%2c_or_Incident.doc (accessed April 22, 2009), 2-3. 
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intensity of conflict between WWII and Iraq is by looking at the 3ID numbers vice the 
numbers for the entire Army in Iraq. That division alone suffered over twice as many 
KIA in almost half the number of days in combat as the entire Army in Iraq. The number 






























Days of Combat Operations 600 907 1855 1129 3650 206 1956 
Number of KIA 50510 6240 234874 33741 30957 224 2962 
Wounded 193663 24,793 565861 103284 96802 354 30,634 
Missing   3,191     118   1 
Number Serving 4057101   8300000 2834000 4368000 2225000   
Total Number of MOH 96 39 301 78 155 0 2 
Number of Distinguished Service Cross 6430 133 4434 723 846 0 11 
Number of Silver Stars N/A 2972 73,651 10,061 21630 75 390 
Number of BSM/V         170626 891 1986 
Table 6.   Comparisons between OIF and Historical Conflicts 
3. Are More or Fewer Awards being Given Today than in the Past? 
The argument has been made in the editorial section of ‘trade’ papers, like The 
Army Times, that not enough top-level awards are being earned in Iraq. In Figure 6, we 
see the ratios between the top four valor awards for Vietnam and Iraq. There seems to be 
considerable (even remarkable) consistency. While 153 more Medals of Honor were 
awarded in Vietnam, the number of lesser awards earned is, proportionally, quite similar. 
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Figure 6.   Showing the Similar Ratio of Awards between Iraq and Vietnam 
Awards add up to far more than just footnotes to an individual or units’ history; 
they help socialize the next generation. Awards create a sense of legacy, and they silently 
but powerfully establish models of what is considered exemplary behavior within the 
organization. 
E. THE EMBEDDED NATURE OF AWARDS IN THE ORGANIZATION 
1. Chain of Command Wall 
Enter any Army company or higher headquarters and there is always a wall with 
the officer and non-commissioned officer chain of command on display. This display, 
usually done in 81/2 x 11 glossy photos, allows every solider to trace his chain of 
command from his immediate commander all the way up to the President of the United 
States.  
Such displays are not just found in the Army, but in all of the services. It is also 
customary for the senior officers to be wearing Class A uniforms that display all of their 
awards. Thus, even though most soldiers in a rifle company will never meet a superior 
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higher than their battalion commander, they can see (and study) what awards their 
superiors have earned. In effect, they can ‘read’ their superiors’ full biography at a 
glance.54 
2. Study of Senior Leaders 
Appendix K represents a brief look at 28 U.S. Army general officers. Included are 
the seven previous Army Chiefs of Staff, three recent notables, eight current senior 
leaders working at positions above the division level, and ten Generals in divisional 
leadership positions. The significance of an award for valor or merit in wartime can 
clearly be inferred. Of the 28, 26, or almost 93%, have earned the Bronze Star for valor 
or merit. One of the two who lacks a Bronze Star, LTG Austin, (commander of the 18th 
Airborne Corps) earned a higher award, the Silver Star.  
In effect, it appears the Bronze Star is the minimum standard for general officers 
in senior leader positions. Perhaps a look at combat support or combat service support 
general officers may have yielded different results. However, the senior leadership 
positions in the Army’s operational formations are filled exclusively with combat arms 
officers. These formations execute policy, and these leaders are the mentors and role 
models for the soldiers engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Figure 7, we see a graphical 
representation of the average awards per general officer. 
 
                                                 
54 Appendix M presents an example of this type of command wall, with an additional example of how 
this depiction of leaders extends beyond the operational force. 
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Figure 7.   Average Number of Each Individual Award per General Officer in the 28 
Person Sample 
3. Award Ceremonies 
The importance of awards is also symbolized by the ceremonies that take place 
when they are presented to recipients. Much care is given to ensure maximum 
participation from all the soldiers in the unit.55 Typically, the unit commander draws up 
the men into formation, and then has those soldiers receiving awards post themselves in 
front of their peers. Most often, the battalion or brigade commander makes the 
presentation. Figure 8 depicts an award ceremony.  
The senior commander present usually describes how proud he is of the 
individuals who have earned the decorations about to be presented. He often lauds them 
for being “what right looks like” and the standard to which everyone should strive. Then, 
while their peers stand at attention in anonymous ranks, the awardees, positioned in front 
of everyone, have the medals clipped onto their uniforms.  
                                                 
55 I have personally witnessed ceremonies in Iraq where two of the three line companies in a battalion 
will surge to cover a given battlespace to allow all the soldiers from the third company to participate in an 
award ceremony. The other event that merits this type of effort is a memorial service. 
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These occasions have a powerful effect on both those receiving an award and 
those witnessing it. As Air Force LTC Raymond Powell describes his feelings on 
receiving his first award: “Proud and excited, I knew I’d accomplished something truly 




Figure 8.   Award Ceremony in Afghanistan57 
 
                                                 
56 Raymond M. Powell, “Medals for Mediocrity: How to Restore Meaning to Air Force Decorations,” 
www.airpower.au.af.mil, March 1, 2009, 
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj09/spr09/powell.html (accessed March 4, 2009). 
57 Picture is of Company A, 2-108th IN, 27th BDE New York Army National Guard, September 19, 
2008 in Afghanistan, www.dmna.state.ny.arng/27bct/stories/awards.html. No credit was given for the 
picture. 
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IV. WHAT PRACTICES OR ACTIONS SHOULD BE 
REWARDED? 
The previous chapter described the Army’s award system. This chapter focuses on 
the type of conflict the Army is involved in today and the ways soldiers are being told 
they should execute it. 
The Army defined its purpose between June 2001 and June 2005, as “The Army’s 
nonnegotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win our Nation’s 
wars.”58 Significant here is that the statement affirms commitment to win our wars, not 
necessarily the wars of other countries.  
Figure 9 marks the gap between ‘traditional’ interstate conflict and internal 
conflict. Internal conflicts have become more prevalent and, if this trend continues, 
appear to have a higher likelihood of occurring in the future. These ‘small’ or 
insurgent/counterinsurgent wars are not recent developments; there is a significant body 
of literature already devoted to them. Discussed below are some of the theories and ‘best 
practices’ for how to wage these types of conflicts. 
 
 
                                                 
58 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 1 The Army (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2001), 21. 
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Figure 9.   Divergence between Interstate and Internal Conflict59 
A. COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY AND ‘BEST PRACTICES’ 
There is a persistent impression that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
represent some new type of war. However, this is far from the truth. The kind of hubris 
that exists today was also evident at the turn of the last century as captured in a quote 
from a movie about the Second Boer War: “This is a new kind of war for a new century, 
George. I suppose this is the first time our enemies have not worn uniforms. Some are 
children, and some…are missionaries.”60 This statement itself ignores centuries worth of 
prior small wars. At least since the British experience in South Africa at the start of the 
20th century, much has been written describing the theory behind 
insurgent/counterinsurgent warfare.  
1. T. E. Lawrence  
T. E. Lawrence was a junior officer in the British Army in the Middle East during 
WWI. An unusual combination of archaeologist, philosopher, diplomat, and soldier, he 
had a profound effect on the results of the campaign. His ability to work across the 
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tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war has seldom been equaled. He wrote a 
400,000-word book about his experiences and his 27 Articles, from which the following 
ideas come, is still prominently posted by American headquarters in Iraq.61 
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it 
tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help 
them, not win it for them. Actually also under the odd conditions of 
Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it 
is.62 
The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may be true, but 
there will be better reasons left for you to divine. You must find these 
inner reasons (they will be denied, but are none the less in operation) 
before shaping your arguments for one course or others.63 
…Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and no ideas except the 
work in hand, so that your brain shall be saturated with one thing only, and 
you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would 
undo the work of weeks.64 
2. David Galula 
David Galula was a French Army Officer who wrote Counter-Insurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice, published in 1964. In it he draws on his experience in 
China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria.  
Invoking what a Chinese communist general said, “A revolutionary war is twenty 
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formula that reflects the truth.”65 When describing the importance of civil authority, he 
adds, “The inescapable conclusion is that the over-all responsibility should stay with the 
civilian power at every possible level.”66 
A further passage, worth quoting at length, seems prescient in describing what did 
not happen during the 2003 American effort in Iraq: 
At some point in the counterinsurgency process, the static units that took 
part initially in large-scale military operations in their area will find 
themselves confronted with a huge variety of nonmilitary tasks which 
have to be performed in order to get the support of the population, and 
which can be performed only by military personnel, because of the 
shortage of reliable civilian political and administrative 
personnel…implementing the various economic and social reforms, etc.—
all these will become their primary activity. They will have to be 
organized and supported accordingly. Thus a mimeograph machine may 
turn out to be more useful than a machine gun, a soldier trained as a 
pediatrician more important than a mortar expert, cement more than 
barbed wire… 
To summarize Galula, the preponderance of action should not involve military 
force; however, the military must be prepared to execute non-traditional tasks if a civilian 
force is unavailable. 
3. David Kilcullen 
Dr. David Kilcullen, a former Australian Army officer, is perhaps the most well 
known of the ‘current’ experts on guerilla warfare. He advised General David Petraeus, 
while he commanded Multinational Force Iraq in 2007, and Condoleezza Rice, the 
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he has since published a book, The Accidental Guerrilla, in 2009.67 According to 
Kilcullen, “‘The more we focus on the enemy, the harder it is to actually get anything 
done with the population.’”68  
In addition, of course, winning the population’s support is the key prize. Yet: 
Even within the armed forces, there is a substantial mismatch between the 
capabilities needed for the current international security environment and 
those actually present in the U.S. military inventory. This is starkest in 
terms of the lack of capacity for stabilization and reconstruction 
operations, and for counterinsurgency or FID (Foreign Internal 
Defense).69  
B. ARMY DOCTRINE 
Since shortly after the Iraq invasion the U.S. Army and the U.S. military as a 
whole have attempted to capture these lessons about counterinsurgency, of which the 
examples above are just a small sampling. 
Army doctrine represents a body of thought about how Army forces intend to 
operate as an integral part of a joint force. Essentially, doctrine establishes how the Army 
views the nature of operations.70 This ‘body of thought’ began to change with the end of 
the Cold War. Since 1989, three revisions have been made to both of the Army’s 
capstone field manuals, FM 1 The Army and FM 3-0 Operations. These revisions, as will 
be shown through examples below, seek to adjust the Army to a world where the strategic 
environment is much different from the one in which it had been operating since WWII. 
The shift in these doctrinal instruments, combined with the creation of specific 
counterinsurgency manuals, give evidence of the shifting way the Army is viewing its 
operational mission. 
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1. FM 171  
Entitled The Army, FM 1, outlines in the broadest sense how the Army defines 
itself and its purpose. A ‘transformational’ shift had already begun, as seen in the June 
2001 version. This transformation was by and large derailed by the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. A revised version of FM 1 published in 2005 better captures the realities of 
an Army at war than the manual released just four years previously.  
Gone are the days when the Army could focus training only on major 
combat operations. Today the Army must train soldiers and units to fight 
insurgents and other irregular threats while executing multiple operations 
worldwide.72 
During and after major combat operations, Army forces contribute to joint, 
interagency, and multinational efforts to exploit the opportunities military victory 
provides and provide strategic permanence to the otherwise temporary effects of 
combat.73 
Another way to see how much FM 1 has changed in a short period of time is to 
look at the pictures that accompany the text. These can be seen in Appendix N. 
‘Traditional war’ imagery is much reduced in the new manual.  
2. FM 3-0  
The 2008 version of FM 3-0, Operations describes itself as a “revolutionary 
departure from past doctrine.” This is a perhaps overstated acknowledgment that the 
ongoing counterinsurgent struggle within Iraq has had a profound effect on the Army as 
an institution. The first of the two passages below is notable because earlier doctrine 
espoused that land power was the sin qua non of any campaign. 
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This edition of FM 3-0 reflects Army thinking in a complex period of 
prolonged conflicts and opportunities. The doctrine recognizes that current 
conflicts defy solution by military means alone and that land power, while 
critical, is only part of each campaign.74 
Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them. 
They often face the enemy among noncombatants, with little to distinguish 
one from the other until combat erupts. Killing or capturing the enemy in 
proximity to noncombatants complicates land operations exponentially. 
Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient. 
Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success.75 
3. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency 
Published in 2006, the counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) field manual was the product 
of then Lieutenant General David Petraeus while he commanded the U.S. Army 
Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. FM 3-24 is not the first field manual to 
address counterinsurgency or guerrilla operations. However, its predecessor, FM 90-8 
Counterguerrilla Operations, appeared in 1986 and never truly evolved or gained 
acceptance by the force. The new manual, released while the conflict was still underway, 
under the auspices of a general with ‘star power,’ received wide acceptance. Some of the 
passages most relevant to the argument here are: 
Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader 
American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of 
the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse 
that trend.76 
Throughout its history, the U.S. Military has had to relearn the principles 
of counterinsurgency (COIN) while conducting operations against 
adaptive insurgent enemies. It is time to institutionalize Army and Marine 
Corps knowledge of this longstanding form of combat.77  
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Ironically, the nature of counterinsurgency prevents challenges to 
traditional lessons-learned systems; many nonmilitary aspects of COIN do 
not lend themselves to rapid tactical learning…performing many 
nonmilitary tasks in COIN requires knowledge of many diverse, complex 
subjects…Progress can be hard to measure and the enemy may appear to 
have many advantages.78  
As a fellow infantry company commander said to me in 2007, “Trying to figure 
out if you are winning (in COIN) is like trying to figure out if your cornfield is growing 
by staring at it for an hour.” 
4. FMI 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency 
The most recent of the field manuals, FMI 3-24.2 (Tactics in COIN), was released 
in 2009. This FM is significant because it transforms the more theoretical aspects from 
the FMs mentioned above into COIN tactics, techniques, and procedures executable by 
the lowest levels of the force. Its target audience is the sharp end of the stick: 
“commanders, staff, and Soldiers of U.S. Army units up to brigade level.”79  
COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by 
a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and 
brigade levels.80 
As the US Army continues its lengthy battles against insurgency around 
the world, tactical units must continue to focus on securing the support of 
the population, achieving unity of effort and learning and adapting faster 
than the insurgents do.81 
Also worth noting is that the recognition of the importance of working with 
foreign partners is not just codified in the manuals, but is being reinforced throughout the 
Army. Recently, LTC Yingling speaking to the student body at the Command and 
General Staff College stated, “The most important task for military forces in the 21st 
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century will be to assist partner states in exercising sovereignty in accordance with 
international norms, including denying sanctuary and support to terrorist 
organizations.”82  
All of the above examples convey the progression of Army thought. From the 
capstone documents that provide the overview and framework to those that outline more 
detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures, an incredible amount of intellectual thought 
and energy has been invested in helping the force learn how to operate more effectively 
in a counterinsurgency.  
Policy makers at high levels in and above the Department of Defense seem keen 
for the military to execute this doctrine. 
C. POLICY STATEMENTS FROM THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
1. New Strategy for Iraq 
Shortly after his inauguration, President Obama announced his strategy for Iraq:  
This strategy is grounded in a clear and achievable goal shared by the Iraqi 
people: an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant. To achieve that 
goal, we will work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, 
representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support not safe-
haven to terrorists.83 
After we remove our combat brigades, our mission will change from 
combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its Security Forces as they 
take the absolute lead in securing their country. As I have long said, we 
will retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training, 
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sectarian; conducting targeted counter-terrorism missions; and protecting 
our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force 
will likely be made up of 35-50,000 U.S. troops.84 
This does not represent a radical departure from where the previous 
administration had been headed. The President’s emphasis is also clearly consistent with 
published counterinsurgency doctrine. 
2. New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan 
Less than a month after announcing its Iraq strategy, the Obama administration 
announced its new strategy for Afghanistan. Significantly, it linked Afghanistan and 
Pakistan together, recognizing that the insurgency there clearly straddles borders. Again, 
it is significant to note the President’s emphasis on training and advising over any 
mention of state-on-state conflict:   
I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and 
focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future…At 
the same time we will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and 
increasing the size of Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually 
take the lead in securing their country. That’s how we will prepare 
Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will 
ultimately be able to bring our own troops home…And later this spring we 
will deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan security 
forces…That’s why my budget includes indispensable investments in our 
State Department and foreign assistance programs. These investments 
relieve the burden on our troops. They make the American people safer. 
And they save us an enormous amount of money in the long run—because 
it’s far cheaper to train a policeman to secure his or her own village—or to 
help a farmer seed a crop than it is to send our troops to fight tour after 
tour of duty with no transition to Afghan responsibility.85 
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3. The Defense Budget 
On April 6, 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates held a press conference to talk 
about his Fiscal Year 2010 budget. This was a notable event, held before the budget 
request had been presented to Congress and just after Congress had recessed for its spring 
break. The timing allowed the Secretary to highlight that the budget supported the 
President’s new policies for both wars, without any immediate backlash from Congress 
over the proposed cuts. Gates’ comments also reflected his alignment with the military’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine and the challenges he recognized they present to the status 
quo: 
As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the Defense 
bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed 
underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences and reward 
structures of America’s Defense establishment—a set of institutions 
largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern navies, 
armies and air forces. Programs to directly support, protect and care for 
the man and woman at the front have been developed ad hoc and funded 
outside the base budget.86 
D. THE NEW WAY OF WAR 
From big picture doctrine to specific tactics, the U.S. Army has, in words at least, 
remade itself. The President has announced policy that is not focused on direct force and 
is consistent with the Army’s new doctrine. Unfortunately, however, the Army is a large 
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E. CONFLICTING REALITY ON THE GROUND 
There is plenty of evidence that adapting to less kinetic, population-centric 
warfare, as well as working with host nation militaries and police, is a challenge given 
the culture of the Army. Recently an embedded reporter described the feelings of some 
combat arms soldiers in Iraq: 
It’s no surprise here that quite a few soldiers would prefer to be in 
Afghanistan. Infantrymen aren’t, for the most part, conducting missions 
that end in firefights too often. And many soldiers don’t make it off Joint 
Base Balad. But there is one way to see some action without leaving the 
friendly—or air-conditioned—confines of the office: video 
games…Countless soldiers dig these games. As one of them told me last 
week, “Hey, I’m trained as an infantryman. And I’m not doing infantry 
stuff. This is as close as I can get for now.”87 
Challenges are not limited to junior soldiers wanting to fight the enemy. Senior 
leaders have made decisions and statements that run contrary to the idea they should use 
as little force as possible. In the following case, U.S. soldiers killed an Iraqi in custody. 
The Brigade Commander was later relieved. 
Several soldiers have said in sworn statements or testimony at the hearing 
that senior officers, including the Third Brigade commander, Michael 
Steele, told them in a gathering the night before the raid to kill any 
military-age male they encountered on the island, where 20 fighters loyal 
to Al-Qaeda were thought to be.88 
F. SUMMARY 
In the previous chapter, I described the U.S. Army award system in some detail 
and suggested that this system, which embodied the actions the Army sought to reward 
during the inter-state wars of the 20th century appears to be at odds with what are  
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considered ‘best practices,’ as described above. Current Army doctrine embraces 
counterinsurgency, which it places just to the left hand side of ‘General War’ on the 
‘Spectrum of Conflict’. Figure 10 depicts this spectrum. 
 
Figure 10.   The Spectrum of Conflict Depicted in FM 3-0 
Yet, one problem with placing counterinsurgency to the left of ‘General War’ is 
that it gives the impression that the dial just needs to be turned down a bit on all the 
things important in a conventional war. In reality however, when it comes to 
counterinsurgency, a soldier needs to do the diametric opposite. David Galula captures 
this dichotomy well: 
“No Politics” is an ingrained reaction for the conventional soldier, whose 
job is solely to defeat the enemy; yet in counterinsurgency warfare, the 
soldier’s job is to help win the support of the population, and in so doing, 
he has to engage in practical politics. A system of military awards and 
promotion, such as that in conventional warfare which would encourage 
soldiers to kill or capture the largest number of enemies, and thus induce 
him to increase the scope and the frequency of his military operations, 
may well be disastrous in counterinsurgency warfare.89  
As to what types of actions have been rewarded in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear 
that there have been, and will continue to be, situations where American service members 
must close with and destroy the enemy. The current awards system is perfectly designed 
to reward these types of actions. An individual who risks death or great injury, and 
distinguishes himself in the face of the enemy, ought to be acknowledged. This type of 
valor truly transcends and cuts across time and space. Valor is as close to a universally 
respected quality as there is.  
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During his budget brief, Secretary Gates explained that counterinsurgency would 
not and should not usurp conventional capabilities: 
So this is not about irregular warfare putting the conventional capabilities 
in the shade. Quite the contrary: this is just a matter—for me at least—of 
having the irregular-war constituency have a – have a seat at the table for 
the first time when it comes to the base budget.90  
We need to extend this analogy of a seat at the table into the realm of awards. The 
top of the award pyramid is not, and should not, be displaced by irregular war.  However, 
if the Army truly wants to institutionalize its counterinsurgency capabilities, it must 
incentivize the proper execution of counterinsurgency somehow. 
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, unilateral operations ought to be more the exception 
than the rule, especially this many years into both campaigns. Even if pitched fights do 
occur, it could be assumed from U.S. doctrine and counterinsurgency theory that the 
battle would be some type of joint, team affair with the host nation and American forces 
fighting together against the insurgents. Working ‘by, with, and through’ the host nation 
government and its security forces, as the Special Forces parlance puts it, is one of the 
most important ‘best practices’ the American military can employ.  
In the next chapter, I explore the effect to which service members are earning 
awards for COIN ‘best practices.’  
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V. WHAT TYPES OF ACTIONS ARE BEING REWARDED IN 
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN? 
The current award system has been described, and the evolution of U.S. policy 
and Army doctrine for counterinsurgency is clear. Chapter II and the appendices provide 
statistics regarding the numbers and types of awards earned by soldiers. These statistics 
are interesting in their own right, but it is important and enlightening to look not just at 
the numbers and types of awards issued, but the reasons and circumstances for an award 
being earned. Is the Army rewarding acts that are consistent with its doctrine?  
A. WHAT ACTIONS WARRANT THE AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR? 
I use the Silver Star to examine the types of actions that have been rewarded. As 
of April 22, 2009, the Army had awarded 549 Silver Stars for actions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.91 The Silver Star is the highest-level award to be presented to soldiers in 
significant numbers.92 Additionally, it is the highest award that can be approved ‘in 
theater’ by the Corps commander who directs the day-to-day operations.93  
The website Hall of Heroes has a database that contains synopses along with 
certificates and citations of the awards earned by American service members. The section 
that covers Silver Stars for the Global War on Terror contains data on 265 of the 549 
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Silver Stars awarded in Iraq and Afghanistan.94 I analyzed these records according to 
several different variables, shown in Table 7. Most of these variables are straightforward 
and self-explanatory. However, for “Was the service member advising or partnering?” I 
often had to make a judgment call. I defined advising and partnering as broadly as 
possible, thus creating a conservative test of the “hypothesis” that these types of actions 
are under-recognized and under-rewarded. Where the recipient is a member of a Military 
Transition Team the designation is clear. In other cases, if there was any mention of host 
nation forces participating in the action in any way, I coded this as advising or partnering.  
Table 7.   Variables Used in Analyzing the Silver Star Database 
Rank Enlisted, Officer, Warrant 
Gender Male or Female 
What Theater? Iraq or Afghanistan 
When did the event occur? Date, at least to the month  
Was the recipient killed? Yes or No 
Was the recipient wounded? Yes or No 
Was the recipient advising or partnering? Yes or No 
Was the recipient a member of Special Forces? Yes or No 
 
To ensure that the records reflect actions that took place across the duration of 
both conflicts thus far, I broke down the awards by year of the event. Shown in Figure 11, 
the data set is spread across the time horizon for the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Over 
half of the citation events date from, or after, 2005 when FM 3-24 was published.  
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Figure 11.   Number of Silver Star Records in Home of Heroes Database by Year95  
Given the degree to which Army doctrine has embraced and codified 
counterinsurgency, I would have expected that the percentage of Silver Stars reflecting 
the key best practice of counterinsurgency—partnering with or advising the host nation—
would at least be close to half. That, however, is not the case. 
Table 8.   Percent of Silver Star Recipients Who Partnered or Advised 
Percent of Silver Star Recipients who Partnered or Advised 19.25% 
 
Appendix T offers additional statistical information from the Silver Star database. 
Of note is the significant over-representation of Special Operations Force (SOF) soldiers. 
Slightly over 20% of the awardees are SOF. Although an actual number is unavailable, 
this is greatly out of proportion to their relative size compared to conventional forces in 
both theaters.96 A SOF soldier who received a Silver Star had over a 50% chance of 
doing so while partnering or advising, 30 percentage points higher than a conventional 
force soldier. This sizable difference does beg the question: should the force within the 
Army that is specifically designed to work with indigenous forces not have an even 
higher percentage?  
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B. WHAT ACTIONS WARRANT INCLUSION ON THE ARMY’S 
WEBSITE? 
The Silver Star database is somewhat constrained as it lists soldiers who have 
won a relatively senior award. The official U.S. Army webpage has a section entitled 
‘Stories of Valor.’ Here is how the site describes itself: “Soldiers in combat are facing 
danger every day and there are many untold stories of valor that deserve recognition. The 
stories on this page capture some of those that have displayed heroic courage through 
their actions in the face of a lethal enemy.”97  
I took 74 records from this site.98 This site officially singles out those individuals 
(and actions) the Army holds in the highest regard. The site managers (representing the 
‘corporate’ army) have the ability to pick and post whichever individual records they 
choose. I have broken these records down according to 11 different variables, shown in 
Table 9. As with the Silver Star dataset, advising or partnering was coded in the broadest 
possible way. 
Table 9.   Variables Used in Analyzing the ‘Army Stories of Valor’ Database 
Rank Enlisted, Officer, Warrant 
Gender Male or Female 
What component was the recipient? Regular Army, Reserve, National Guard 
What Theater? Iraq or Afghanistan 
What award was earned? varies from skill badge to Medal of Honor 
Was category does the award fall into? Valor or Service 
When did the event occur Date, at least to the month  
Was the recipient killed? Yes or No 
Was the recipient wounded? Yes or No 
Was the recipient advising or partnering? Yes or No 
Was the recipient a member of Special Forces? Yes or No 
 
                                                 
97 For an example of the U.S. Army homepage, and the information contained in a record, see 
Appendix Q. The coded dataset is contained in Appendix U. 
98 There were additional records for awards given to soldiers for previous conflicts listed on the 
webpage. For example, several stories about MSG Woodrow Keeble, who was awarded the Medal of 
Honor for actions in the Korean War, appeared. Since this thesis focuses on the present counterinsurgency 
conflicts, these types of records were omitted.  
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The ‘Army Stories of Valor’ was also checked to ensure that the records reflect 
actions that took place across the duration of the conflict; the awards are also broken 
down by year of the event. Shown in Figure 12, the data set is generally spread across the 
time horizon for the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. However, we see a much greater 
representation of more recent (2007-8) events. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Number of Records by Year in Army ‘Stories of Valor’ Site 
Since the ‘Stories of Valor’ site can be selective and the majority of citations are 
for events in or after 2007, several years after the release of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 
I would have expected the percentage of records involving the ‘best practice’ of 
partnering and advising to be higher than we saw with the Silver Star database. Again, 
COIN-specific activity appeared to be under-rewarded and, surprisingly, the number is 
lower than for the Silver Star dataset. 
Table 10.   Percent of Recipients in ‘Stories of Valor’ Who Partnered or Advised  
Percent of Recipients in Stories of Valor who 
partnered or advised 17.81% 
 
The ‘Stories of Valor’ statistics, shown fully in Appendix V, are interesting in 
several other ways. The percentage of SOF who also partnered/advised is even higher 
than in the Silver Star dataset, with over 72% of SOF awardees working with the host 
nation. Also notable is the very low percentage of female awardees, at just four percent. 
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C. WHAT ACTIONS WARRANT INCLUSION ON THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE WEBSITE? 
The U.S. Army is by no means fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan on its own. Just 
as the Army has its public domain website that documents actions by soldiers, the 
Department of Defense also has a site. This site, linked off the main Department of 
Defense website, describes itself this way: “Since September 2006, the Department of 
Defense has highlighted the military men and women who have gone above and beyond 
the call of duty in the Global War on Terror. These are our American Heroes' stories.”99 
This database contains records of awards, from the ARCOM level through the Medal of 
Honor, earned by members of all the armed services (including the Coast Guard) in the 
current conflicts. I was able to extract 186 records from this database.100 These records 
are broken down using the variables shown in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Variables Used in Analyzing the Department of Defense ‘Heroes’ Database 
Branch of Service 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast 
Guard 
Rank Enlisted, Officer, Warrant 
Gender Male or Female 
What component was the recipient? Active Force or Reserve/Guard 
What Theater? Iraq or Afghanistan 
What award was earned? varies from skill badge to Medal of Honor 
Was category does the award fall into? Valor or Service 
When did the event occur Date, at least to the month  
Was the recipient killed? Yes or No 
Was the recipient wounded? Yes or No 
Was the recipient advising or partnering? Yes or No 
Was the recipient a member of Special Forces? Yes or No 
                                                 
99 For an example of the Department of Defense webpage, the way each record is presented and the 
type of information contained in each record, see Appendix R. Appendix W contains the coded dataset. 
100 Unlike the Army ‘Stories of Valor,’ all records were of individuals involved in the GWOT. On 
October 14, there were 188 records. When I rechecked the records in April 2009, two records present in 
October had been removed. Therefore, I removed those two records from my dataset. 
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As with the other two datasets, the number of awards over time was plotted to 
ensure that the records do not reflect a bias toward the beginning of the campaigns. 
Again, most awards were earned during or after 2005. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Number of Awards by Year in DoD Heroes Site101 
One might think the Department of Defense, being the umbrella organization over 
the individual services, and with the resources to produce a higher quality finished 
product, would display more records on its webpage consistent with the best practices of 
counterinsurgency. I certainly expected the percentage of award recipients who partnered 
or advised to be higher than we saw with the Army site and the Silver Star dataset since 
the DoD could compensate for any service bias. Again, there appears to be limited 
recognition of COIN best practices. 
Table 12.   Percent of Award Recipients Who Partnered or Advised in the Department 
of Defense Database 
Percent of Award Recipients who partnered 
or advised in DoD Database 20.43% 
 
The number here is only slightly more than one percent higher than with the 
Silver Star dataset. Full statistics appear in Appendix S. The percentage of female service 
                                                 
101 The number of records on the DoD Heroes website as of October 28, 2008. 
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members was slightly higher than on the Army site, at seven percent. Within this DoD 
dataset, comparisons can be made between services. Interestingly, the Marine Corps, 
which is the second most represented service in number of rewards (behind the Army), 
has the fewest number of award recipients who partnered/advised. Table 13 lists the 
percentage of partner/advising awards by branch of service. 
Table 13.   Percentage of Partner/Advising Awards by Service 
Army 24.24% 




Looking at these three different datasets, it is clear that actions involving 
partnering with or advising host nation forces are recognized significantly less frequently 
than are successful, unilateral kinetic operations. Thus, by an overwhelming percentage, 
the Army and Department of Defense official websites project as the standard, 
individuals whose actions—while valorous—are contrary to established COIN doctrine. 
This leads to the question: how do junior and mid-level leaders who have been involved 
in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan feel about counterinsurgency? Do they think 
counterinsurgency ‘best practices’—or counterinsurgency as a best practice—should be 
rewarded? 
D. DO SOLDIERS THINK THAT COIN ‘BEST PRACTICES’ MERIT AN 
AWARD? 
To answer these questions, I consulted a number of my peers in the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Defense Analysis department, along with several other officers I 
served with in Iraq. While this sample size may seem small, it represents a high level of 
total military experience and time spent in combat—from a minimum of six months to a 
maximum of 25 months. Branches represented include Infantry, Special Forces, Armor, 
Aviation, Field Artillery, and Civil Affairs. 
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Not one of the 28 people I interviewed responded that counterinsurgency-specific 
achievements should not be recognized.102 The fact that 100% of my sample agreed that 
these types of achievements should be recognized indicates that, to at least some extent, 
this group recognizes and understands the basics of the Army’s counterinsurgency 
doctrine. This is probably not surprising based on their level of combat experience.  
Where there was disagreement, however, was over how exactly those 
achievements should be recognized. For instance, fewer than half felt that the current 
system was working and should not be changed.103 
We have more types of awards in our toolkit than we need. Adding more 
just focused on COIN would be a mistake.  
The specific award (i.e., ARCOM etc.) can still be used in a COIN 
environment, but it requires the writer (and more importantly, the 
approver) to understand what to write. 
More than half of those interviewed felt that the current system can be adapted to 
better reward COIN best practices. For instance:  
I don’t think you can use current awards to reward COIN achievements; 
you need something new, because in the approval process the leadership 
will compare apples to oranges and downgrade COIN achievements in the 
face of conventional combat actions / achievements. 
Other officers talked about the creation of a new decoration altogether, or the 
creation of a device that can be worn on an existing service award such as the Iraqi or 
Afghanistan Campaign Medal: “I think the device to be worn on the ICM or ACM would 
be feasible, and give recognition in addition to singular achievement and tour awards 
currently in the system.” 
                                                 
102 Please see Appendix Z for examples of what individuals in this convenience sample said were 
counterinsurgency-specific achievements.  
103 The comments shown here have been edited for clarity and are the result of interviews conducted 
at the Naval Postgraduate School and by electronic means in March-April 2009. Appendix Y lists unedited 
comments. 
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Finally, some talked about being allowed to wear host nation awards. For 
example, “If the host nation award is selected it should be specific to COIN and not 
general to all Soldiers participating in the conflict.” 
A small portion in each camp expressed frustration with leaders who, because 
they are the gatekeepers of the award system, wield tremendous influence over how the 
system works. 
The solution in my opinion lies with the intermediate and approval 
authorities (all Commanders) – they have to understand that significant 
achievements in COIN can be just as effective as storming an enemy 
pillbox. 
It’s on the commander to make the right decisions in the awards process. I 
believe that across the Army there needs to be a greater understanding of 
COIN and the difficulty in executing it properly. 
Volumes have been written about leadership. How the Army leadership should 
best exercise its authority and discretion through the award system could fill volumes 
more. When speaking with my peers and reflecting on my experiences there seems to be 
agreement that a ‘good’ leader can take a flawed system and make it work, while a ‘bad’ 
leader can take the same flawed system and turn it into an unmitigated disaster. 
One thing that should be clear from this convenience sample is that no matter how 
the Army decides to effect realignment between what it asks for and what it rewards, it 
will find no shortage of opinions among officers about the award system as a whole. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The U.S. Army is an institution steeped in tradition, strongly cognizant of where it 
has been. It has not always been quite so decisive about where it is headed.  
The Army’s culture has its roots in its traditions and history. The Army 
cherishes its past and nourishes its institutional memory through 
ceremonies and a tradition...The Army’s rich and honorable history of 
service to the Nation reminds Soldiers of who they are, the cause they 
serve, and their ties to those who have gone before them.104 
The General Officer in charge of the Infantry Branch releases a quarterly 
newsletter. Highlighted below are portions of his most recent comments discussing 
culture:  
The culture of the United States Army Infantryman is alive and 
flourishing. It carries a rich tradition that reaches back for almost 234 
years. As Infantry leaders we have the responsibility to perpetuate the 
culture of service, sacrifice, and esprit de corps so commonly associated 
with our chosen branch…I remind all Infantrymen that Soldiers will 
remember the standard that is enforced, not the standard that is 
discussed.105 
Speaking from experience, he is right when he says the standard enforced, not the 
one discussed, is what soldiers remember.  
With this in mind, what effect do websites like the DoD Heroes and Army Stories 
of Valor have on the soldiers who look at them? If 80% of the individuals highlighted on 
these websites are performing actions, which, while clearly valorous, are contrary to the 
doctrine and best practices for counterinsurgency, are the needs of the Army and the 
national strategy it executes being as well served as they could be? 
                                                 
104 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 1 The Army (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2005), 1-15. 
105 Michael D. Barbero, “Infantry Senior Leader Newsletter,” The United States Army Infantry Center 
and School, May 5, 2009, 
https://www.benning.army.mil/OIP/content/Infantry%20Newsletter/newsletter.htm (accessed May 5, 
2009). The added emphasis is mine. 
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I began this study with a quote from Steven Kerr, discussing the “folly of 
rewarding A, while hoping for B.” It seems clear that, in a broad sense, the Army is 
rewarding its members in the same manner, for the same actions, as it did in WWII. Most 
Sergeants and Specialists who interact daily with the people of Iraq and Afghanistan will 
probably never read the Field Manuals describing counterinsurgency doctrine. However, 
they will notice who around them is receiving awards, and they will know and remember 
what those individuals did to earn them. It is indeed folly to think that soldiers will 
consistently perform the actions necessary to execute counterinsurgency successfully 
when they see those around them being rewarded for something else. 
The Army is being pulled in two different directions. Figure 15 offers a rendition 
of this dilemma. The Army’s corporate identity is still influenced by the world wars. The 
way the pyramid of honor was designed, and the extent to which it has remained 
unchanged, is one indication of how stable or static this corporate identity is. 
 
Figure 14.   The Opposing Push and Pull between Doctrine and Awards Policy106 
                                                 
106 The spectrum of conflict bar is taken from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, FM 3-
0 Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 2-1. 
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A. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. What did Veterans of Past Counterinsurgency/Guerrilla Conflicts 
Want? 
Col. Ben Malcom served as an advisor to a guerrilla force during the Korean War. 
Year later, he sought to be awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge for recognition of his 
direct combat experience. Malcom captures some of the frustration he felt struggling for 
acknowledgment of his actions in his memoir, White Tigers:  
The army bureaucracy’s efforts to downplay what those who served in 
special operations and unconventional warfare jobs in Korea had done was 
apparent in the manner with which it dealt with the issue of who was 
authorized to wear the Combat Infantryman Badge. 
Some of my colleagues found the ruling just another item on a long list of 
frustrations that went with the job of working with the partisans.107 
Some recommended areas that warrant further study are: 
• More detailed survey work on perceptions soldiers have of the award 
system. 
• More detailed surveys on the type of reward(s) desired by soldiers on the 
‘cutting edge’ of COIN. Do soldiers who are a part of small ad hoc MiTTs 
have different needs than members of an SF team or an entire Army 
brigade that has been ‘re-tasked’ as an advising brigade? 
• Surveys must be done over time so that veterans, with the benefit of 
hindsight, can be asked whether the awards they received during the 
conflict have the same value to them after the passage of time. 
• Surveys should be done of officers who have written awards, or those who 
are approval authorities for awards, especially at Division and Corps 
levels where a committee often recommends approval or disapproval to 
the commander. One question worth asking is whether that committee 
synced with what the commander thought was an appropriate award. 
• Some attention needs to be paid not just to the number of awards, but the 
narrative accompanying them. This thesis is certainly preliminary in 
suggesting what might be done with more time and resources to collect  
 
 
                                                 
107 Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 1996), 211. 
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data on why a certain award was given. This is a potential azimuth check 
for higher headquarters, including DoD, so that the Army (and DoD) can 
see exactly what types of actions are being rewarded. 
• There needs to be clear consistent communication from leaders, 
specifically at Battalion and Brigade level, about what types of actions 
they think are important in counterinsurgency. 
B. SOME WORDS OF CAUTION 
This thesis is not arguing that by creating a new award the Army will magically 
become better at counterinsurgency. Any award needs to be earned to have value. This 
perception not only applies to the person who receives the awards, but to the members of 
the organization as a whole. For instance, here is how Col. Hackworth describes his 
attitude during the Korean War: 
For field-grade officers and above, it seemed as if the awards system had 
become little more than a giveaway program…I concluded then and there 
that a valor decoration awarded to anyone above the rank of captain, 
unless accompanied by a Purple Heart, was an unearned one.108 
Vietnam also had its problems with the award system. In the following example, a 
relatively senior officer earned 27 awards during his tour. Such a system is irresponsible 
and cannot help but cause resentment:  
Colonel John Donaldson’s Vietnam career is illustrative. In 1968 he was 
given command of the Americal Division’s 11th Brigade, which a few 
months earlier had sent Lieutenant Calley’s Platoon into My Lai. The 
Colonel replaced Colonel Oran Henderson, who would be acquitted of the 
charge of a My Lai cover-up. In his first six months of command, Colonel 
Donaldson ‘earned’ an ‘average of about one medal a week: two 
Distinguished Flying Crosses, two Silver Stars, a Bronze Star Medal for 
Valor, twenty Air Medals, a Soldier’s Medal, and a Combat Infantryman 
Badge. He was soon promoted to brigadier general and won nine 
additional Air Medals and two legions of Merit, and transferred to the 
Pentagon as a strategist.109 
                                                 
108 David H. Hackworth, About Face (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 256-7. 
109 Loren Baritz, Backfire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 301. 
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An inflated awards system is not healthy for the Army or the soldiers who serve. 
However, what is equally counterproductive is to not specifically recognize the types of 
actions that some of the sharpest minds, both inside and outside the Army, think are vital 
for success in counterinsurgency.  
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Valor awards recognize an action that has universal and cross-cultural merit. They 
are a timelessly unimpeachable proof of courage. The types of dynamic, kinetic actions 
that warrant a place on the pyramid of honor have been ingrained in the consciousness of 
the Army through the state-on-state wars of the 20th century. Yet, nearly a decade into the 
21st century, very different types of actions are required for success in a 
counterinsurgency environment. This is the environment we are in today and for the 
foreseeable future. Despite—or perhaps because of—the challenges with quantifying 
success in COIN, the awards system is the best way to incentivize the actions needed to 
prevail in this war, and then serve as proof for the veterans of this war about what  helped 
them win. 
Ray Nance, the last of the ‘Bedford boys,’ a group of soldiers from Bedford VA 
who suffered terrible casualties on D-Day June 6 1944, died in April 2009.  Below is a 
picture of him with medals and bits of ribbon from almost 65 years ago. The Army 
Awards system served him and his brothers well, providing motivation in a challenging 
time. These awards were specifically created to fit the situation in which Nance was 
fighting. Their importance to him is clear in the photograph. The fact he kept these 
‘baubles’ for over 60 years is another indication of their value.  
What will the veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan be showing their grandchildren in 
60 years? If it is the same awards for the same actions that Nance and his brothers 











Figure 15.   Mr. Nance with his World War II Decorations110 
                                                 
110 Associated Press, “Last D-Day 'Bedford Boy' Dies at 94,” www.armytimes.com, April 21, 2009, 
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Soldiers that serve on our Transition Teams (TTs) and our Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) are developing exactly the type of knowledge, skills and abilities that are 
vital for our Army to be effective in an era of persistent conflict. These are tough, 
demanding positions and the members of these teams are required to influence 
indigenous or surrogate forces as they execute missions that are of vital interest to this 
Nation. The tasks associated with Transition Teams, from direct combat to stability 
operations, will be a major part of full spectrum engagement in theaters of interest now 
and for the foreseeable future. I want to ensure that the officers that lead these teams are 
recognized and given the credit they deserve. 
 
I am directing that the Major's positions on these teams be immediately designated and 
codified in DA PAM 600-3, for all branches, as Key and Developmental (KD). Any 
officer holding one of these positions will be considered “KD” for his or her branch as a 
Major. Additionally, these officers will be afforded the opportunity, should they desire, to 
hold an additional 12/24 months of a branch specific KD position (e.g. XO, S-3, etc). Our 
promotion board guidance already stresses the importance of these positions and this 
additional information will be added to all upcoming board instructions. Additionally, 
because the success of these teams requires our best leaders, I have directed HRC to 
award Centralized Selection List (CSL) Credit for LTCs serving specifically in the TT 
Commander positions that have direct leadership responsibility for a training/transition 
team. 
 
Therefore, we are creating a new CSL sub-category called “Combat Arms Operations”. It 
will be open to all eligible officers in the Maneuver, Fires and Effects (MFE) branches 
and to Foreign Area Officers (FAO). It will fall under the Operations category and will be 
effective on the FY 10 CSL board which meets this September. 
 
As a bridging strategy, for FY09 we will activate officers for these command positions 
from the alternate lists of all four major MFE command categories - Operations, Strategic 
Support, Training, and Installation. Officers accepting and who serve will be awarded 
CSL credit in the Operations category for serving as a Transition Team Commander. 
Additionally, if selected by the FY 10 CSL board, the officer may opt to command in the 
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category they are selected after completion of their TT Command. Those that do 
command will receive credit for a second CSL command. If chosen, and they opt not to 
command, they will still receive credit for their TT command. 
 
Our ability to train and operate effectively with indigenous forces will be a key element 




                                                 
111 George Casey, “CSA Sends-Transition Team Commanders,” SmallWarsJournal.com. June 18, 


























APPENDIX E.  
REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO WWI 
 
Decoration Service Date Instituted Criteria 
Purple Heart Army 1782 
For Military Merit. Only known to be 
presented to three soldiers. 
Disappeared from use after the 
Revolutionary War 
Honorary Badge of 
Distinction Army 1782 
Veteran NCO and soldiers who served 
more than three years. Disappeared 
immediately after the Revolutionary 
War 
Certificate of Merit Army 1847 
For distinguishing oneself in battle, 
literally a paper certificate until 1905 
when it was transferred into metallic 
form 
Medal of Honor Army 1861 
For conspicuous gallantry and 
intrepidity at the risk of one's life, 
above and beyond the call of duty 
 
Service Medal Service Date Instituted Criteria 
Spanish Campaign Medal Army 1905 Service in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands in 1898 
Philippine Campaign Medal Army 1905 Service in the Philippines between 1899-1906 
China Campaign Medal Army 1905 Service in China with the Peking Relief Expedition 1900-1 
Philippine Congressional Medal Army 1906 
Service in the Philippines between 1899-
1902 and serving longer than discharge 
date 
Civil War Campaign Medal Army 1907 Service between 15 April 1861 and 9 April 1865 
Indian Campaign Medal Army 1907 Service in the Indian campaigns between 1865-1891 
Army of Cuba Pacification 
Medal Army 1909 Service in Cuba 1906-9 
Army of Cuba Occupation 
Medal Army 1915 Service in Cuba between 1898 and 1902
Spanish War Service Medal Army 1918 Service between 1898-1899 for persons not eligible for the SCM 
Army of Puerto Rico Occupation 
Medal Army 1919 
Service in Puerto Rico between 14 Aug-
10 Dec 1898 
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APPENDIX F.  
CREATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM WWI THROUGH WWII 
 
Decoration Service Date Instituted Criteria 
Distinguished Service Cross Army 1918 
Extraordinary heroism not 
justifying the award of a 
Medal of Honor; while 
engaged in an action against 
an enemy of the U.S. or 
while serving with friendly 
foreign forces. The act or 
acts of heroism must have 
been so notable and have 
involved risk of life so 
extraordinary as to set the 
individual apart from their 
comrades. 
Distinguished Service Medal Army 1918 
Exceptionally meritorious 
service to the government in 
a duty of great 
responsibility. The 
performance must be such 
as to merit recognition for 
service which is clearly 
exceptional. Exceptional 
performance of normal duty 
will not alone justify an 
award of this decoration. 
For service not related to 
actual war, the term duty of 
great responsibility applies 
to a narrower range of 
positions than in time of war 




Decoration Service Date Instituted Criteria 
Soldiers Medal Army 1926 
Heroism not involving 
actual conflict with an 
armed enemy of the United 
States. The performance 
must have involved personal 
hazard or danger and the 
voluntary risk of life. 




Heroism or extraordinary 
achievement while 
participating in aerial flight
Silver Star All Services 1932 
Gallantry in action against 
an enemy of the United 
States while engaged in 
military operations 
involving conflict with an 
opposing foreign force. The 
required gallantry while of a 
lesser degree than that 
required for the 
Distinguished Service 
Cross, must nevertheless 
have been performed with 
marked distinction. 




Any member of the armed 
forces who has been 
wounded, killed or may die 
of wounds received from an 
opposing enemy force while
in armed combat or as a 
result of international 
terrorism 
Army Presidential Unit 
Citation Army 1942 
Army units for 
extraordinary heroism in 
action against an armed 
enemy 




Heroic actions or 
meritorious service while 
participating in aerial flight 
but not of a degree that 
would justify an award of 
the Distinguished Flying 
cross. 
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Decoration Service Date Instituted Criteria 





conduct in the performance 
of outstanding services and 
achievements. For service 
not related to actual war, the 
term 'key individuals' 
applies to a narrower range 
of positions than in a time of 
war and requires evidence of 
significant achievement. 
Army Meritorious Unit 
Commendation Army 1944 
Army units for 
exceptionally meritorious 
conduct in the performance 
of outstanding service 




While serving in the United 
States Armed Forces in a 
combat theater, distinguish 
themselves by heroism, 
outstanding achievement or 
by meritorious service not 
involving aerial flight. 
Awards may be made for 
acts of heroism which are of 
lesser degree than required 
for the award of the Silver 
Star  





achievement or meritorious 
service. Acts of valor which 
are of lesser degree than 
required for award of the 
Bronze star medal 
World War I Victory Medal Army 1919 
Service between 1917-1918 
and in the Expeditionary 
Forces in Russia 1918-20 
Army Good Conduct Medal Army 1941 
Exemplary conduct, 
efficiency and fidelity 
during three years of active 
enlisted service  
American Defense Service 
Medal All services 1941 
12 months of active service 
between 1939-41 
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Decoration Service Date Instituted Criteria 
Army of Occupation of 
Germany Medal Army 1941 
Service in Austria-Hungary 
or Germany between 1918-
1923 
American Campaign Medal All services 1942 
Service outside the US in 
the American theater for 30 
days or within the CONUS 
for one year 
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign 
Medal All services 1942 
Service in the Asiatic-
Pacific theater for 30 days 
or upon receipt of any 
combat decoration 
European-African-Middle 
Eastern Campaign Medal All services 1942 
Service in the European-
African-Middle Eastern 
theater for 30 days or receipt 
of any combat decoration 
Woman's Army Service 
Medal Army 1943 
Service with both the 
WAAC and WAC between 
1942-1945 
World War II Victory Medal All services 1945 Service between 7 Dec 1941- 31 Dec 1946 
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APPENDIX G.  
SINCE WWII 
 
Decoration Service Date Instituted Criteria 




Awarded to U.S. Army units for 
outstanding heroism in armed combat 
against an opposing force 
Meritorious Service 
Medal Army 16-Jan-69 
Outstanding noncombat meritorious 





Exceptionally meritorious service to the 
United States while assigned to a Joint 






Superior meritorious service to the United 
States while assigned to a Joint Activity in 





Noncombat meritorious achievement or 
service while assigned to a Joint Activity 




Awarded to Joint Service units for superior 
meritorious achievement or service 
Army Achievement 
Medal Army 1-Aug-81 
Awarded to members of the Armed Forces 
below the rank of colonel who, while 
serving in any capacity with the Army in 
an noncombat area, distinguish themselves 
by outstanding achievement or meritorious 
service, but not of a nature that would 






Meritorious service or achievement while 





Meritorious service or achievement while 
assigned to a Joint Activity 




Awarded to U.S. Army units for 
meritorious performance in difficult and 
challenging peacetime missions 
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Decoration Service Date Instituted Criteria 




30 consecutive days of service in occupied 
territories of former enemies during the 
following period-1945-55 (Berlin 1945-90)




120 days of service while participating in 
or providing support for the Berlin Airlift 
during the period June 26, 1948 to 
September 30 1949 
Korean Service Medal All Services 1950 
Participation in military operations within 





Any honorable active duty service during 
any of the prescribed periods (1950-4, 











Participation in military operations not 
covered by specific war medal 
Vietnam Service Medal All Services 1965 
Service in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia or 





Direct Participation in specific operations 





Successful completion of designated NCO 
professional development courses 
Army Service Ribbon All Services 1981 
Successful completion of initial entry basic 
training 
Prisoner of War Medal All Services 1985 
Awarded to any member of the U.S. 
Armed Forces taken prisoner during any 
armed conflict dating from WWI 




Active participation in, or support of, 
Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm 






Awarded for outstanding and sustained 
voluntary service to the civilian 
community, 1993-Present 




Participation in military operations not 
covered by a specific war medal or the 





Active participation in, or direct support 
of, Kosovo operations 
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Decoration Service Date Instituted Criteria 





Active participation in, or support of, 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 
IRAQI FREEDOM and/or subsequent 
follow-on operations while deployed 
abroad for service in the Global War on 
Terrorism, 2001-TBD 




For Service in the Republic of Korea, or 
the waters adjacent thereto, for a 
qualifying period of time between 28 July, 





Active service in direct support of 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 2001-
TBD 
Iraq Campaign Medal All Services 2004 
Active service in direct support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-TBD 





Active participation in, or service in 
support of Global War on Terrorism 
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APPENDIX H.  
Badge Date Instituted Criteria 
Army Aviator Badge 1917 Completed prescribed training and tests and be designated as an aviator 
Parachutist Badges 1941 
Satisfactorily completed the prescribed proficiency 
tests or have participated in at least one combat 
jump 
Driver and Mechanic 
Badge 1942 
Be assigned as a driver for 12 months or have 
driven 8000 miles with no accidents  
Combat Infantryman 
Badge 1943 
1. Be an infantryman O-6 and below satisfactory 
performing infantry duties  
2. Assigned to an infantry unit during such time as 
the unit is engaged in active ground combat  
3. Actively participate in such ground combat 
Expert Infantryman 
Badge 1943 
Be in the MOS 11 or 18, meet all prerequisites and 
proficiency tests prescribed by the US Army 
Infantry Center 
Pathfinder Badge 1944 Completion of the Pathfinder course conducted by the US Army Infantry School 
Combat Medical Badge 1945 
O-6 and below assigned or attached by orders to 
any ground combat unit Brigade or smaller who 
satisfactory perform medical duties while the unit is 
engaged in active ground combat, provided they are 
personally present and under fire. 
Flight Surgeon Badges 1945 Be a medical service officer satisfactorily completes prescribed requirements 
Aviation Badges 1947 Enlisted member on flying status for 12 months or 48 flight hours 
Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal Badges 1950 
Completion of conventional render safe 
qualifications as prescribed for the EOD course of 
instruction 
Parachute Rigger Badge 1951 Complete Parachute Rigger Course  
Diver Badges 1960 Meet the qualification requirements as prescribed in AR 611-75 
Expert Field Medical 
Badge 1965 
Be a medical career management field member (or 
11D) and pass test as prescribed by the US Army 
Medical Department Center and School 
Air Assault Badge 1978 Completion of the Air Assault training course 
Military Free Fall 
Parachutist Badge 1994 
Completed prescribed program of instruction or 
participate in a military free fall combat jump 
 78 
Badge Date Instituted Criteria 
Combat Action Badge 2005 
1. May be awarded to any Soldier  
2. Must be performing assigned duties in an area 
where hostile fire pay or imminent danger pay is 
authorized  
3. Soldier must be personally present and actively 
engaging or being engaged by the enemy, and 
performing satisfactorily in accordance with the 
prescribed rules of engagement 
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APPENDIX I.  
Department of Defense Awards are governed by their own regulation, DoD 
1348.33-M September 1996, Incorporating change 1, September 18 2006. These awards 
were created, starting in 1963, to recognize service members assigned to joint activities 
who could only be recognized by an existing service decoration. The five Defense and 
Joint decorations listed in the table below complement, and are generally considered 








Defense Superior Service Medal Legion of Merit 








Joint Service Achievement Medal Army Achievement Medal 
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APPENDIX K.  








































































































































































































































































































































General John Wickham   1   2   4     1   1       
General Carl Vuono   1 3     1     1 6         
General Gordon Sullivan   1     1 1       1 1   2   
General Dennis Reimer   1 1     2 1     3 1       
General Eric Shinseki   2 2     2     1 2 2 1 3   
General Peter Schoomaker   3 2     3       2   2     
Army Chief 
of Staff 
General George Casey   2 2     3           1 1   
                               
General Colin Powell   4 2   1 2   1   1 1       
General H Norman Schwarzkopf   1 3 3 1 1 1   1 2 1     1Recent Notables General Wesley Clark   5 2 1   4       2 1       
                               
                                                 







































































































































































































































































































































General David Petraeus CENTCOM   2 2   2 4     1     3 3   
MG Jay Hood CENTCOM     1   3 2       1         
General Raymond Odierno MNC-I     1   1 6       1   4 4   
General Martin Demsey TRADOC   2 2   1 3     1 1   3 3   
General Charles Campbell FORSCOM   1     1 4       1   6 6   
General Walter Sharp USFK   1     1 1       1         
LTG Joseph Peterson FORSCOM     1   1 3       1   5 5   
Sr Leadership 
LTG Lloyd Austin 18th ABN CORPS   1 1 1 1 2           1 5   
                               
MG Mark Hertling 1st AR DIV         1 4       4 1     1
BG Perry Wiggins 1st INF DIV   1       1       1 1   1 1
MG John Morgan III 2nd INF DIV         2 2       1     6   
BG Walter Golden Jr 2nd INF DIV           2       1   1 6   
BG James L Crighton 2nd INF DIV   1       1       1   1 6   
BG Patrick Dohahue 3d INF DIV           3       4   4     
MG Jeffery Hammond 4th INF DIV           1       2   1 6   
MG Jeffery Schloesser 101 ABN DIV         2 1       1     2   
BG Mark Milley 101 ABN DIV         2 2       3     6   
Current Div 
Leadership 
BG James McConville 101 ABN Div           2       1   2 3   
 Sum 0 30 25 7 21 67 2 1 6 44 10 35 68 3
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Four of the ‘traditional’ U.S. Army in Action pictures (descriptions of the action are 
included in the FM) in the 2001 version of FM 1. Only one, the Meuse-Argonne print, 
remained in the 2005 edition. Intentional or not, this signals a shift in emphasis and a 
notable change from 2001.  
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APPENDIX O. 
DA 638 for Silver Star, Note Corps Cdr is approval authority 
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APPENDIX P. 
Silver Star Database example 
 
 
Example of synopsis of situation and events resulting in the awarding of the Silver Star 
from the Home of Heroes Silver Star Citation database.113 
                                                 
113 Home of Heroes, “U.S. Army Awards of the Silver Star 2001-Present,” www.homeofheros.com, 
March 10, 2009, http://www.homeofheroes.com/valor/08_WOT/ss_GWOT/citations_USA.html (accessed 
March 10, 2009). 
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Front page of the us.army.mil webpage 10/28/2009. Stories of Valor are available on the 




Example of information contained in Army’s ‘Stories of Valor’ website. This record can 




DoD Heroes Example  
 
 
Front page of the U.S. Department of Defense (defenselink.mil) 10/28/2009. Heroes section is located on the lower left. 
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Example of the information contained in the DoD Heroes database. This record can be found at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/heroes/profiles/ayalaJ.html 
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APPENDIX S. 




























Adamec, Jeffrey - (OIF) 6     0         1 3 
Alicea, Benny - (OIF) 4     0   1     1 4 
Allen, Frederick - (OIF) 7     0     1 1 1 4 
Alvarez, Jose - (OIF) 4     0         1 6 
Anderson, David S. - (OIF) 6     0         1 6 
Anderson, Roderick C. - (OEF) 9     1     1 1 1 4 
Ashby, Randall Lee - (OIF)     2 0         1 3 
Baldwin, Brent R. - (OIF) 6     0       1 1 4 
Ballard, Thomas - (OIF) 8     0   1     1 7 
Barbieri, Thomas Joseph, II - (OIF) 4     0 1 1     1 6 
Barrera, Michael L., Jr. - (OIF) 6     0         1 5 
Becker, Shane - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 7 
Bellavia, David - (OIF) 6     0   1     1 4 
Bennett, Sean - (OIF) 7     0   1 1   1 7 
Bernstein, David R. - (OIF)     2 0 1 1     1 3 
Betten, Joshua D. - (OEF) 7     1         1 3 
Bieger, Mark - (OIF)     4 0         1 4 
Binney, Matthew - (OEF) 6     1   1 1 1 1 6 
Bittinger, Raymond - (OIF) 6     0         1 4 
Blaskowski, Matt - (OEF) 6     1   1     1 5 
Borbonus, John G. - (OIF) 3     0 1 1     1 7 
Brandon, Joshua - (OIF)     3 0     1   1 6 
Brannon, Patrick - (OEF) 6     1         1 5 
Branson, Charles E. - (OIF)     3 0         1 3 
Braxton, Kenneth - (OIF) 6     0         1 3 
Brown, Jason D. - (OIF) 6     0         1 3 
Brown, Monica - (OEF) 3     0         0 7 
Bryant, Christian - (OEF) 6     1         1 7 
Buelow, Nathan J. - (OIF)   2   0     1 1 1 6 
Burns, Kyle - (OEF)     2 1         1 6 
Butler, Jacob Lee - (OIF) 5     0 1 1     1 3 
Camacho, Eddie - (OEF) 4     1         1 3 




























Canon, Arin K. - (OEF) 6     1         1 2 
Carter, Chris - (OIF)     3 0         1 3 
Cashe, Alwyn C. - (OIF) 7     0 1 1     1 5 
Caylor, Dennis - (OIF) 8     0         1 3 
Cebreros, Gildardo - (OIF) 4     0         1 7 
Chao, Cornell C. - (OIF)   3   0 1 1     1 7 
Choay, Christopher - (OEF) 6     1         1 5 
Church, Jeremiah - (OIF) 4     0     1   1 6 
Church, Jeremy - (OIF) 3     0         1 4 
Clemmer, Brent - (OIF)     3 0         1 7 
Collier, Russell L. - (OIF) 5     0 1 1     1 4 
Collins, Robert - (OIF) 8     0     1 1 1 5 
Colucci, David G. - (OEF) 6     1         1 4 
Conroy, Jason - (OIF)     3 0         1 3 
Coomer, John - (OIF) 8     0         1 6 
Cornford, Steven - (OIF) 4     0   1     1 7 
Cowart, Daniel - (OIF) 5     0   1     1 7 
Cremin, Colin - (OIF)     2 0         1 4 
Dakos, Raymond - (OIF) 7     0         1 3 
Davis, Jefferson Donald - (OEF) 8     1       1 1 1 
Dean, Christopher P. - (OIF)     2 0         1 4 
DeJesus, Angel - (OEF)   2   1       1 1 6 
Dennis, Jerod R. - (OEF) 3     1 1 1     1 3 
Deponai, Andrew T. - (OIF)     3 0         1 3 
DePouli, Raymond M. - (OEF) 6     1         1 2 
DesJardin, James - (OIF)     3 0         1 3 
Diaz, Jason - (OIF) 6     0         1   
Dobbins, Stephen - (OIF)     3 0   1     1 6 
Durbin, Jerry M., Jr. - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 6 
Dwyer, Kenneth M. - (OEF)     3 1   1 1 1 1 6 
Echols, Javier - (OIF) 6     0         1 5 
Edgy, Gannon - (OIF) 6     0         1 3 
Edwards, David M. - (OIF) 6     0         1 5 
Eldred, Jerad - (OEF) 6     1   1 1 1 1   
Espino, Erasmo, Jr. - (OEF) 6     1         1 6 
Estes, Justin M. - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 7 




























Felix, Bradley M. - (OEF) 6     1   1 1 1 1 4 
Fernandez, Christopher - (OIF) 3     0         1 4 
Fetty, Jason - (OEF) 6     1     1 1 1 3 
Finn, Shane F. - (OIF)     3 0         1   
Ford, Sheffield F., III - (OEF)     3 1       1 1 6 
Fowler, Paul A. - (OIF)     3 0         1 4 
Franco, Kenneth R. - (OIF) 6     0         1 3 
Fuhrmann, Ray Michael, II - (OIF) 4     0     1   1 5 
Gagne, Eric - (OIF) 8     0         1 7 
Gant, James - (OIF)     4 0     1   1 6 
Ghent, Richard - (OIF) 4     0   1     1 6 
Goltry, Brennan S. - (OIF)     3 0   1     1 7 
Good, Charles - (OIF) 6     0       1 1 3 
Gregory, Karl - (OIF)     2 0   1     1 5 
Grenz, Allen - (OEF) 5     1         1 3 
Gross, Nicholas S. - (OEF) 6     0     1 1 1 5 
Grover, Mark - (OIF) 6     0         1 7 
Gruidl, Matthew T. - (OIF) 7     0         1 3 
Hall, Danny R. - (OIF) 7     0     1 1 1 5 
Hall, Rashe - (OEF) 6     1   1     1 6 
Harkins, Jason - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 7 
Harriman, Andrew Scott - (OIF) 4     0         1 7 
Harriman, Stanley Lorn - (OEF)   2   1       1 1 2 
Hernandez, Abram - (OEF) 7     1   1 1 1 1 6 
Herring, James B. - (OIF)   3   0     1 1 1 6 
Hester, Leigh Ann - (OIF) 5     0         0 5 
Hibner, Dan - (OIF)     3 0         1 3 
Hibner, Dave - (OIF)     3 0   1     1 3 
Hilliard, Jon M. - (OIF) 6     0   1     1 7 
Hobbs, Craig - (OIF) 6     0         1 3 
Holmes, Bruce - (OEF) 7     0     1 1 1 5 
Holt, Wesley - (OIF) 6     0         1 4 
Hope, Jason - (OEF)   1   1       1 1 5 
Horton, Eric - (OEF) 7     1   1   1 1 6 
Howard, Mark - (OEF) 7     1   1 1 1 1 6 
Huber, Haldon H. - (OEF) 8     1       1 1   




























Iban, Ismael - (OIF) 7     0         1 7 
Inch, Norman - (OIF) 5     0         1   
Ingram, Jeff - (OIF)     5 0         1 3 
Jacobsen, Petter - (OIF) 8     0   1 1   1 7 
Johns, Stephan - (OEF) 7     1       1 1 4 
Johnson, Allen C. - (OEF) 7     1 1 1   1 1 5 
Johnson, Thomas H., Jr. - (OIF)     3 0         1 4 
Jones, Benjamin - (OEF) 7     1       1 1 4 
Jordan, Patrick - (OIF) 5     0         1 4 
Joseph, Joshua V. - (OIF) 3     0         1 5 
Julian, Matthew - (OEF) 7     1       1 1 5 
Kay, Shannon - (OIF) 6     0   1     1 4 
Kaylor, Jeffrey J. - (OIF)     2 0 1 1     1 3 
Keefe, Matthew - (OEF) 6     1       1 1 5 
Keil, Blake - (OIF)     3 0         1   
Keller, Gregory - (OIF) 6     0     1 1 1 7 
Kirkwood, Sean - (OIF) 8     0     1 1 1 7 
Kobes, Gerrit - (OIF) 4     0     1   1 4 
Lacamera, Paul - (OEF)     5 1         1 2 
LaFrenz, Matthew - (OEF) 5     1         1 2 
Lamkin, Andrew J. A. - (OIF) 4     0         1 4 
Lamoreaux, Cory L. - (OEF) 8     1         1 2 
Lancey, Raymond - (OIF) 8     0     1 1 1 7 
Lara, Peter - (OIF) 7     0         1 5 
Lewis, Andrew - (OEF) 7     1       1 1 3 
Logsdon, Keith - (OEF) 8     1     1 1 1 5 
Lowe, David - (OEF) 7     1     1 1 1 5 
Lundgren, Curtis - (OIF) 4     0   1     1 7 
Lybert, Patrick - (OEF) 6     1 1 1     1 6 
Maholic, Thomas D. - (OEF) 8     1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Mahon, Kelly - (OIF) 8     0       1 1 3 
Maitre, Benjamin - (OEF)     3 1         1 2 
Malmberg, Chad A. - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 7 
Mangels, John E. - (OEF) 7     1   1     1 6 
Marshall, John W. - (OIF) 7     0 1 1     1 3 
Martin, Joseph - (OIF) 5     0         1 4 




























Mayfield, Kirk - (OIF)     3 0         1 4 
McCarty, Michael - (OIF)     2 0         1 4 
McGuire, Shawn - (OIF) 6     1         1 7 
McInerney, Michael J. - (OEF)   1   1     1 1 1 3 
McLaughlin, Michael E. - (OIF)     5 0 1 1 1   1 6 
McMullen, Michael J. - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 5 
McQuade, Sean P. - (OEF)     3 1     1   1 7 
Meyer, Harrison J. - (OIF) 3     0 1 1     1 4 
Mike, Jason L. - (OIF) 4     0         1 5 
Miles, David - (OIF) 8     0       1 1 3 
Miller, Joshua - (OIF) 4     0         1 4 
Miller, Patrick - (OIF) 3     0         1 3 
Millican, Jonathan - (OIF) 2     0 1 1 1   1 7 
Miltenberger, Robert - (OIF) 6     0         1 4 
Molino, Christopher A. - (OIF)     3 0         1 5 
Moore, William Clint - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 7 
Morales, Francisco - (OEF) 7     1         1 6 
Mulligan, Terry - (OIF) 7     0         1 3 
Nethery, Brian - (OIF) 6     0         1 7 
Newell, Peter - (OIF)     5 0         1 4 
Newlin, Mark - (OIF) 7     0         1 6 
Newton, Casey H. - (OEF)     2 1         1 4 
Nunez, Octavio - (OIF) 6     0         1 7 
Olsen, Jeremiah C. - (OEF) 4     1         1 2 
Palumbo, Christopher - (OEF)   3   1     1   1 5 
Payne, William Thomas - (OIF) 6     0         1 4 
Perkins, Andrew - (OIF) 5     0 1 1     1 7 
Perkins, David G. - (OIF) 6     0         1 3 
Peters, Steven - (OIF) 5     0         1 7 
Petithory, Daniel Henry - (OEF) 7     1 1 1   1 1 1 
Pixler, Ross C. - (OIF)     2 0   1     1 7 
Plush, David M. - (OIF) 6     0         1 7 
Prakash, Neil - (OIF)     2 0     1   1 4 
Prater, Terry William - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 4 
Price, Bruce E. - (OEF)   2   1 1 1 1 1 1 4 
Proctor, Joseph E. - (OIF) 5     0 1 1 1   1 6 




























Pryor, Anthony S. - (OEF) 8     1       1 1 2 
Pugh, Robert Shane - (OIF) 5     0 1 1     1 5 
Pushkin, Gregory - (OIF) 4     0         1 6 
Quinn, Patrick M. - (OIF) 8     0     1 1 1 3 
Ray, Grant - (OIF) 5     0   1     1 3 
Ray, Jonathon - (OEF) 7     0         1 3 
Reis, Larry - (OEF) 8     1     1   1 5 
Remington, Kevin K. - (OIF) 8     0       1 1 3 
Resh, Mark T. - (OIF)     3 0     1   1 7 
Rich, Christopher - (OIF) 5     0         1 4 
Rieman, Tommy - (OIF) 5     0         1 3 
Riling, Ron - (OIF) 9     0         1 3 
Ringgenberg, Dirk D. - (OEF)     3 1         1 5 
Ritenour, Matthew - (OEF) 6     1   1     1 7 
Rivas, Jose M. - (OEF) 5     1     1   1 7 
Rodriguez, Jose R. - (OIF) 7     0         1 7 
Rohrs, Peter David - (OEF) 6     1         1 7 
Roundtree, Cliff - (OEF) 7     1     1 1 1 5 
Rowell, Frederic L. - (OIF) 6     0         1 3 
Sanderlin, Robert - (OEF) 8     1   1   1 1 7 
Sanders, Micheaux - (OIF) 4     0   1     1 4 
Sar, Sarun - (OEF) 8     1   1   1 1 5 
Sartin, Jerry D. - (OIF)   3   0         1 7 
Scalise, Rodney A. - (OEF) 6     1     1 1 1 6 
Schafer, Michael W. - (OEF) 6     1 1 1     1 5 
Sebban, Benjamin L. - (OIF) 7     0 1 1     1 7 
Self, Nathan E. - (OEF)     3 1   1     1 2 
Setzer, John - (OEF) 7     1   1     1 3 
Shanaberger, Wentz Jerome Henry,
III - (OIF) 7     0 1 1     1 4 
Sheetz, Brian M. - (OIF) 4     0   1     1 6 
Sims, Sean P. - (OIF)     3 0 1 1     1 4 
Small, Andrew R. - (OEF) 3     1 1 1     1 6 
Smith, Peter L. - (OIF) 8     0         1 4 
Stack, Michael Boyd - (OIF) 9     0 1 1   1 1 4 
Stebner, Eric W. - (OEF) 5     1         1 2 




























Stever, Robert A. - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 4 
Strickland, Ronald Gregory - (OEF) 7     1         1 7 
Strobino, Jay Christopher - (OIF) 4     0         1 7 
Swope, Jerry - (OIF) 7     0     1   1 5 
Szott, Joshua - (OIF) 5     0         1 3 
Tabron, Donald - (OEF)   1   1         1 2 
Tanish, Patrick Shannon - (OIF) 5     0 1 1     1 4 
Tarlavsky, Michael Yury - (OIF)     3 0 1 1   1 1 4 
Tate, John - (OIF)     3 0         1 6 
Taylor, Jarrod - (OIF) 4     0   1     1 7 
Thibeault, Victor - (OEF) 4     1   1     1 3 
Thomas, Ken - (OIF) 5     0     1   1 7 
Tiedeman, David - (OIF)     2 0         1 5 
Tillman, Pat - (OEF) 4     1     1   1 4 
Tomlin, William Charles - (OEF) 7     1         1 7 
Totten-Lancaster, Aaron - (OEF) 4     1   1     1 2 
Trattles, Patric L. - (OEF) 6     1         1 5 
Turner, Dwayne - (OIF) 2     0         1 3 
Turner, Kyle - (OIF) 3     0   1     1 3 
Twitty, Stephen - (OIF)     5 0         1 3 
Underwood, Larry - (OIF) 4     0         1 4 
Vaccaro, Angelo J. - (OEF) 4     1         1 6 
Vaccaro, Angelo J. - (OEF) 4     1 1 1     1 6 
Vanlandingham, John - (OIF)     3 0     1   1 4 
Velez, Jose "Freddy" - (OIF) 4     0 1 1     1 4 
Viene, Justin - (OEF) 6     1         1 4 
Villalobos, Gary - (OIF) 7     0     1   1 5 
Vitagliano, Thomas E. - (OIF) 6     0 1 1     1 5 
Volesky, Gary - (OIF)     5 0         1 4 
Voss, Jude - (OEF) 6     1   1   1 1   
Walker, Joshua J. - (OEF) 5     1         1 2 
Walters, Donald - (OIF) 5     0 1 1     1 3 
Warrick, Clinton A. - (OIF) 4     0     1   1 6 
Watts, Roger G. - (OIF) 7     0       1 1 4 
Wells, Christopher B. - (OEF)     4 1     1 1 1 5 
Wilmoth, Harper - (OEF) 6     1         1 2 




























Wilzcek, Jeremy - (OIF) 6     0         1 6 
Witkowski, James - (OIF) 5     0 1 1     1 5 
Wolford, Gerald Alex - (OIF) 6     0         1 3 
Worrell, Matthew Wade - (OIF)     4 0         1 6 
Worthan, Ryan L. - (OEF)     4 1         1 3 
Yost, Anthony Ray - (OIF) 8     0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Young, Justin - (OIF) 5     0         1 7 
Young, Terry Fuller - (OIF) 4     0     1   1 6 
Zamarripa, John J. - (OIF) 6     0         1 7 
Zedwick, Matthew - (OIF) 5     0         1 4 
















E‐2 2 0.99% O‐2 12 23.08% 2001 2
E‐3 10 4.95% O‐3 29 55.77% 2002 16
E‐4 31 15.35% O‐4 5 9.62% 2003 52
E‐5 27 13.37% O‐5 5 9.62% 2004 55
E‐6 67 33.17% O‐6 6 11.54% 2005 41
E‐7 38 18.81% 2006 41
E‐8 23 11.39% 2007 50
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APPENDIX U. 
Army Stories of Valor Coded Database 
 
 




























































































































































































Goltry Bernnan   3   1     1 SS 1 0 Feb-07 0 1 0 0 
Mcginnis Ross 4     1     1 MH 1 0 Dec-06 0 1 1 0 
Brown  Monica 4     1     0 SS 1 0 Apr-07 1 0 0 0 
Hibner Dan   3   1     1 SS 1 0 Apr-03 0 0 0 0 
Hibner Dave   3   1     1 SS 1 0 Apr-03 0 0 0 0 
Adamac Jeffery 6     1     1 SS 1 0 Apr-03 0 0 0 1 
Prior Anthony 8     1     1 SS 1 0 Jan-02 1 1 0 1 
Ignrim Jeffery   5   1     1 SS 1 0 Mar-03 0 0 0 0 
Wolferd  Gerald 6     1     1 SS 1 0 Mar-03 0 1 0 0 
Bittiger Raymond 6     1     1 SS 1 0 Apr-03 0 0 0 0 
Fernadaz Christopher 3     1     1 SS 1 0 May-04 0 0 0 0 
Rieman Tommy 5     1     1 SS 1 0 Dec-03 0 1 0 0 
Dean Christopher   2   1     1 SS 1 0 Apr-04 0 1 0 0 
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Rilling Ron 9     1     1 SS 1 0 Apr-04 0 0 0 0 
Sanders Imischeaux 4     1     1 SS 1 0 Apr-04 0 1 0 0 
Prakash Neal   2   1     1 SS 1 0 Jun-04 0 0 0 0 
Church Jermey 3       1   1 SS 1 0 Apr-04 0 0 0 0 
Alica Benny 5     1     1 SS 1 0 Nov-08 0 1 0 0 
Szott Joshua 5     1     1 SS 1 0 Sep-03 0 0 0 0 
Hester  Leigh Ann 5         1 0 SS 1 0 Mar-05 0 0 0 0 
Echols Javier 6         1 1 SS 1 0 Mar-05 0 0 0 0 
Valobous Gary 7     1     1 SS 1 0 Jun-05 0 0 0 0 
Palumbo Christopher     3 1     1 SS 1 0 Apr-05 1 0 0 0 
Sor Sorun 8     1     1 SS 1 0 Feb-05 1 0 0 1 
Richburg Martin 6       1   1 Arcom 1 0 Mar-06 0 0 0 0 
Winsky Brain   5   1     1 Bsm 1 0 Sep-06 0 0 0 0 
Galvan Troy 6     1     1 Sm 0 0 Feb-06 Us 0 0 0 
Anderson David 6     1     1 SS 1 0 Sep-06 0 0 0 0 
Nein Timothy 6         1 1 DSC 1 0 Mar-05 0 0 0 0 
Burra Micheal 6     1     1 SS 1 0 Jul-06 0 0 0 0 
Sanford Steven 3     1     1 DSC 1 0 Mar-06 0 1 0 0 
Wilsnick Jermey 6     1     1 SS 1 0 Mar-06 0 0 0 0 
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Warrick Clinton 4     1     1 SS 1 0 Sep-06 0 0 0 0 
Goltry Bernnan   3   1     1 SS 1 0 Feb-07 0 1 0 0 
Judd Johny     4 1     1 Am 1 0 Jan-07 0 0 0 0 
Sanjaureo Marvin 6     1     1 Bsm 1 0 Nov-06 0 0 0 0 
Schilling  Matthew 6     1     1 Bsm 1 0 Feb-07 0 0 0 0 
Hansen Tim  5     1     1 Arcom 1 0 May-07 0 0 0 0 
Devia Benjamin  4     1     1 Arcom 1 0   0 0 0 0 
Burrows Mark      2 1     1 Dfc 1 0 Jul-07 0 0 0 0 
Zylstra Brandon 6     1     1 SS 1 0   0 0 0 0 
Malmburg Chad 6         1 1 SS 1 0 Jan-07 0 0 0 0 
Thomas Ken 5     1     1 SS 1 0 Feb-07 0 0 0 0 
Fetty Jason 6       1   1 SS 1 0 Feb-07 1 0 0 0 
Jackson Walter   2   1     1 DSC 1 0 Sep-06 0 1 0 0 
Ham Elliot     1 1     1 Dfc 1 0 May-06 0 0 0 0 
Willams Gregory 5     1     1 DSC 1 0 Oct-06 0 1 0 0 
Johnson Zachary     3 1     1 Dfc 1 0 Jan-07 0 0 0 0 
Claud Charles 5     1     1 Bsm 1 0 Sep-07 0 1 0 0 
Brown  Monica 3     1     0 SS 1 0 Mar-07 1 0 0 0 
Smith  Paul 7     1     1 MH 1 0 Apr-03 0 1 1 0 
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Waterbury Forrest 4     1     1 Bsm 1 0 Mar-07 0 1 1 0 
Elliott Curtis 8     1     1 Sm 0 0 Aug-03 0 0 0 0 
Inabnet Ryan  5     1     1 Bsm 1 0 Jul-07 1 0 0 0 
Martinette Ryan  4     1     1 Bsm 1 0 Aug-06 0 1 0 0 
Geressy Eric 8     1     1 SS 1 0 Sep-07 0 0 0 0 
Allden Micheal 7     1     1 Sm 0 0 Feb-08 Ger 0 0 0 
Philips Erich 6     1     1 DSC 1 0 Aug-07 1 0 0 0 
Ruske Gregory 5       1   1 SS 1 0 Apr-08 1 0 0 0 
Martinez Moises 6     1     1 Sm 0 0 Nov-05 Us 0 0 0 
Oconner Brandon 8     1     1 DSC 1 1 Jun-06 1 0 0 1 
Oconner Brandon 8     1     1 DSC 1 1 Jun-06 1 0 0 1 
Quinn Pat 8       1   1 SS 1 1 Apr-03 0 0 0 1 
Mictell Mark    4     1   1 DSC 1 1 Nov-01 1 0 0 1 
Proctor Joesph 5         1 1 SS 1 1 May-06 0 1 1 0 
Allen Fredrick 7     1     1 SS 1 1 Aug-04 0 0 0 1 
Brandon Joshua   3   1     1 SS 1 1 Aug-06 0 0 0 0 
Gant Jim   4   1     1 SS 1 1 Dec-07 0 0 0 0 
Vanlandenhan John   3       1 1 SS 1 1 Nov-04 0 0 0 0 
Maggard Lloyd 7     1     1 Ph 0 1 Nov-05 0 1 0 0 
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Jensen Tyler   2       1 1 SS 1 1 Jan-07 1 0 0 1 
Kite Chad 7     1     1 SS 1 1 Jun-07 0 0 0 1 






















8.22% E‐3 4 7.41% O‐2 4 28.57%
% of Awardees in Army National Guard 9.59% 17.81% E‐4 7 12.96% O‐3 6 42.86%
82.19% E‐5 11 20.37% O‐4 2 14.29%
95.89% E‐6 18 33.33% O‐5 2 14.29%
4.11% 24.66% E‐7 6 11.11%
5.48% E‐8 7 12.96%
73.97% E‐9 1 1.85%
6.85% 93.15%
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Abraharsom Joshua   1       6     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Jun-06 0 0 0 
Ackerman Elliot       1       2 0 1 SS 1 0 Nov-04 0 0 0 
Adams Jarred       1   5     0 1 SS 1 0 Jan-05 0 1 0 
Adlesperger 
Christophe
r       1   3     0 1 NC 1 0 Nov-04 0 0 0 
Alcazar Carlo 1         6     0 1 NC 1 0 Nov-07 1 0 0 
Albietz Edward   1       6     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Mar-07 0 0 0 
Alvarez Jose 1         4     0 1 SS 1 0 Mar-06 0 0 0 
Amerine  Jason 1             4 0 1 Bsm 1 1 Nov-01 1 0 0 
Archie Paul       1   8     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Feb-07 0 0 0 
Arellano James 1         3     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Aug-06 0 1 1 
Arends  Joel 1             3 1 1 Bsm 0 0 Apr-05 0 0 0 
Axelson Matthew     1     5     0 1 NC 1 0 Jun-05 1 1 1 
Ayala Juan       1       6 0 1 LOM 0 1 Jan-07 0 0 0 
Baylosis Benito     1         4 0 1 Bsm 0 0 Aug-06 0 0 0 
Bennett Johnathan   1           3 0 1 Bsm 0 1 Sep-05 0 0 0 
Baughman Nathaniel 1         4     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Jul-06 0 1 1 
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Betterton Robert 1         5     1 1 Bsm 1 1 Apr-05 0 1 0 
Bishop Timothy   1       6     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Aug-05 0 0 0 
Bittinger Raymond 1         7     0 1 SS 1 0 Apr-04 0 0 0 
Boada Stephen       1       2 0 1 SS 1 0 Feb-06 1 0 0 
Bodani Jack 1         5     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Sep-08 1 1 0 
Bogart Daniel       1   6     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Mar-07 0 0 0 
Bonaldo Derek 1             4 1 1 Bsm 0 1 Feb-07 0 0 0 
Boudreaux Bryan     1         2 0 1 Bsm 0 0 Sep-05 0 0 0 
Broadwell Teresa 1         4     0 0 Bsm 1 0 Oct-03 0 0 0 
Brookins Dexter 1             4 0 1 Bsm 0 0 May-03 0 0 0 
Bruckenthal Nathaniel         1 4     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Apr-04 0 1 1 
Buhain Joseph 1         6     1 1 Bsm 0 1 Mar-05 1 0 0 
Burkhart Daniel 1             3 0 1 Bsm 0 1 Apr-08 1 0 0 
Burnette Richard 1         8     0 1 Bsm 0 0 May-05 0 1 0 
Butler Alfred       1       3 0 1 Bsm 1 0 Dec-04 0 0 0 
Camp Mark       1   4     1 1 SS 1 0 May-05 0 1 0 
Campbell Kim   1           4 0 0 DFC 1 0 Apr-03 0 0 0 
Cardenas Moses       1   4     0 1 SS 1 0 Aug-07 0 1 0 
Carmack Gregory   1       7     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Jun-06 0 0 0 
Carpenter Kevin 1         7     1 1 Bsm 1 0 Oct-05 0 0 0 
Carter Lisa 1             4 0 0 Bsm 0 0 May-03 0 0 0 
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Chapman John    1       6     0 1 AFC 1 0 Mar-02 1 1 1 
Chavez Ralph     1     8     0 1 Bsm 0 1 Feb-08 1 0 0 
Chesarek William       1       4 0 1 DFC 1 0 Jun-06 0 0 0 
Chiarini Joshua     1     4     0 1 SS 1 0 Feb-06 0 0 0 
Chontosh Brian       1       3 0 1 NC 1 0 Mar-03 0 0 0 
Church Jeremy 1         4     1 1 SS 1 0 Apr-04 0 0 0 
Cissell Brian     1     7     0 1 Bsm 0 1 Dec-06 0 0 0 
Claude Charles 1         5     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Sep-07 0 1 0 
Clemens Michael 1         8     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Nov-06 0 0 0 
Clough Justin       1   5     0 1 
Mar of 
the Year 0 0 Dec-07 0 0 0 
Coffman James 1             6 0 1 DSC 1 1 Nov-04 0 1 0 
Copeland Willie       1   5     0 1 NC 1 0 Apr-04 0 0 0 
Corbin Todd       1   4     0 1 NC 1 0 May-05 0 0 0 
Cousins Matthew 1             3 1 1 Bsm 0 0 Mar-04 0 0 0 
Covel Earl   1       6     0 1 SS 1 1 Jun-04 0 0 0 
Cunningham Jason   1       3     0 1 AFC 1 0 Mar-02 1 1 1 
Cutler Tracy 1         8     0 1 Bsm 0 1 Oct-04 1 0 0 
Davis Cameron 1         5     0 1 Arcom 0 0 Apr-08 0 0 0 
Dean Reginald     1     8     0 1 Bsm 0 1 Jun-06 0 0 0 
Dementer Alan     1     5     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Mar-03 0 0 0 
Desfrosseillier Todd       1       5 0 1 SS 1 0 Dec-04 0 0 0 
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Deitz Danny     1     5     0 1 NC 1 0 Jun-05 1 1 1 
Diorio Frank       1       4 0 1 Bsm 1 0 Apr-05 0 0 0 
Dixon Robert 1             4 0 1 Bsm 0 1 Jul-07 0 0 0 
Doeherty William 1         9     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Apr-05 0 1 0 
Dollard Ian       1   4     0 1 SS 1 0 Jun-07 0 1 0 
Dunham Jason       1   4     0 1 Mh 1 0 Apr-05 0 1 1 
Espinoza Armando       1       4 0 1 DFC 1 0 Apr-03 0 0 0 
Fetty  Jason 1         6     1 1 SS 1 0 Feb-07 1 1 0 
Flores  Gerald       1   6     0 1 Bsm 0 1 Dec-07 0 0 0 
Frady Michael   1       5     1 1 Bsm 1 0 Apr-04 0 0 0 
Freeman Brian 1             3 1 1 Arcom 0 1 Jan-07 0 1 1 
Ford  Sheffield 1             4 0 1 SS 1 1 Jun-06 1 0 0 
Foust  Shawn   1       5     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Apr-08 0 0 0 
Gagliano Jason       1   5     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Jan-06 0 0 0 
Gainey Michael 1         7     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Oct-07 0 0 0 
Gallucci Ryan 1         5     0 1 Bsm 0 1 Sep-05 0 0 0 
Glover Matthew   1           4 0 1 DFC 1 0 Nov-04 0 0 0 
Goltry Brennan 1             3 0 1 SS 1 0 Feb-07 0 1 0 
Good Charles 1         7     0 1 SS 1 0 Oct-03 0 0 0 
Gouak Stephen       1   6     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Jul-07 0 0 0 
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Gratton Matthew     1         3 0 1 Bsm 0 1 Sep-05 0 0 0 
Hair Justin 1         3     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Jun-05 0 0 0 
Hamill James     1     6     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Feb-07 1 0 0 
Hamlin Max 1         7     1 1 Bsm 0 0 Aug-03 0 0 0 
Hannan Karl 1           3   1 1 Bsm 0 0 Jan-05 0 0 0 
Herring James 1           3   1 1 SS 1 1 Dec-06 0 0 0 
Hester  Leigh Ann 1         5     1 0 SS 1 0 Mar-05 0 0 0 
Hill Lori 1           3   0 0 DFC 1 0 Mar-06 0 1 0 
Houtman Pat   1           4 1 1 DFC 1 0 Nov-04 1 0 0 
Hunter Jeff       1   5     1 1 SS 1 0 May-05 0 0 0 
Ivanov Cheryl 1         4     1 0 Efmb 0 1 Jan-07 1 0 0 
Jackson Bryan 1             2 0 1 DSC 1 0 Sep-06 0 1 0 
Johnson Crystal 1         5     0 0 Arcom 1 0 Sep-06 0 1 0 
Kane Sean 1         6     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Aug-07 0 1 0 
Kasal Bradley       1   9     0 1 NC 1 0 Nov-04 0 1 0 
Keehan Michael   1       8     0 1 SS 1 0 Apr-03 0 0 0 
Ketterer Clarence 1         6     1 1 Bsm 1 0 Oct-05 0 0 0 
King Philip   1       4     0 1 Bsm 1 1 Aug-06 1 0 0 
Kimberling Jason   1       6     0 1 Bsm 1 1 Aug-06 1 0 0 
Kimmey Drew 1         7     0 1 SS 1 0 Nov-07 1 1 0 
Koele Shane 1         6     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Mar-05 1 1 1 
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Kuge Jessica   1       6     0 0 Bsm 0 0 Jan-07 0 0 0 
Lemme Kraig 1         4     0 1 Sm 1 0 Oct-04 0 0 0 
Leoncio Nathaniel     1     4     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Oct-05 0 1 0 
Lindsey Nathaniel 1         5     1 1 Bsm 0 1 Sep-06 1 1 1 
Lomax Brian   1           2 0 1 Bsm 0 0 Jan-09 0 0 0 
Luttrell Marcus     1     6     0 1 NC 1 0 Jun-05 1 1 0 
Lynn Kevin   1       9     0 1 Bsm 0 1 Jul-04 0 0 0 
Malmberg Chad 1         6     1 1 SS 1 0 Jan-07 0 0 0 
Marshall Benjamin 1         5     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Jul-06 0 0 0 
Matson 
Christophe
r 1             4 1 1 Bsm 0 1 May-07 0 0 0 
McCarty Michael 1             2 1 1 SS 1 0 Nov-04 0 0 0 
McDade Aubrey       1   5     0 1 NC 1 0 Nov-04 0 0 0 
McLeese Justin       1   3     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Sep-04 0 0 0 
Merchant 
Christophe
r 1         4     1 1 Bsm 0 0 Oct-05 0 1 0 
Mike Jason 1         5     1 1 SS 1 0 Mar-05 0 0 0 
Miles David 1         8     0 1 SS 1 0 Apr-03 0 0 0 
Miller Luke       1   6     0 1 Bsm 1 0 May-05 0 0 0 
Mitchell Robert       1   4     0 1 NC 1 0 Nov-04 0 1 0 
Mora  Ezequiel 1         5     0 1 Bsm 1 0 May-07 0 0 0 
Moore Marcus 1           2   1 1 DFC 1 0 Dec-06 0 0 0 
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Murphy Michael     1         3 0 1 Mh 1 0 Jun-05 1 1 1 
Nein Timothy 1         6     1 1 DSC 1 0 Mar-05 0 0 0 
O'Connor Brendan 1         7     0 1 DSC 1 1 Jun-06 1 0 0 
Padmore Kent       1   6     0 1 NMccm 1 0 Jun-05 0 1 0 
Payne WIlliam 1         6     0 1 SS 1 0 Sep-04 0 0 0 
Peterson Timothy 1             2 0 1 Bsm 0 0 Sep-07 0 0 0 
Pettus Marion 1         4     0 1 Bsm 1 0 Feb-08 0 1 0 
Pixler Ross 1             2 0 1 SS 1 0 Oct-07 0 1 0 
Prather Craig   1           3 0 1 DFC 1 0 Nov-04 0 0 0 
Proctor Joseph 1         5     1 1 SS 1 1 May-06 0 1 1 
Pryor Anthony 1         8     0 1 SS 1 0 Jan-02 1 1 0 
Pullen Ashley 1         4     1 0 Bsm 1 0 Mar-05 0 0 0 
Pushkin Gregory 1         4     0 1 SS 1 0 Mar-06 0 0 0 
Ramirez Ignacio 1         4     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Aug-06 0 1 1 
Richburg Martin 1         6     1 1 Arcom 1 0 Mar-06 0 0 0 
Rieman Tommy 1         5     0 1 SS 1 0 Dec-03 0 1 0 
Roller Joshua 1         6     1 1 Bsm 0 1 Dec-06 1 0 0 
Rowell Frederick 1         7     0 1 SS 1 0 Apr-03 0 0 0 
Row  Michael 1         5     1 1 Bsm 1 0 Mar-06 0 1 0 
Rubio Juan     1     5     0 1 SS 1 0 Jan-05 0 1 0 
Russell Brian       1       4 0 1 Bsm 0 1 Sep-07 0 0 0 
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Salo Matthew 1             2 1 1 DFC 1 0 Dec-06 0 0 0 
Sanders Micheaux 1         5     0 1 SS 1 0 Apr-04 0 1 0 
Sar Sarun 1         8     0 1 SS 1 0 Mar-05 1 0 0 
Sapp Bradley     1     6     0 1 Bsm 1 0 May-06 0 0 0 
Schauble Jason       1       3 0 1 SS 1 0 Jan-05 0 0 0 
Servais Adam   1       3     0 1 Bsm 1 1 Aug-06 1 1 1 
Shropshire Michael   1       5     0 1 SS 1 0 Mar-03 0 0 0 
Skubin Brian     1         3 0 1 Bsm 0 0 Oct-06 0 0 0 
Smette Keith 1         5     1 1 Bsm 0 0 Apr-03 0 1 1 
Smith  Paul 1         7     0 1 Mh 1 0 Mar-03 0 1 1 
Solheim Kent 1             3 0 1 SS 1 0 Jul-07 0 0 0 
Sparrow Scott 1             1 0 1 Bsm 0 0 Sep-07 0 0 0 
Stacy Robert 1           4   1 1 DFC 1 0 Dec-06 0 0 0 
Stephens Chad 1         7     1 1 SS 1 0 Jun-04 0 1 0 
Stout Michael 1             6 0 1 DssM 0 1 Apr-03 1 0 0 
Stroisch Henry   1       8     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Sep-04 0 0 0 
Sudlow Jeremy   1       5     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Feb-08 0 0 0 
Taggart Jason     1     8     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Mar-05 0 0 0 
Taylor Ryan 1         5     1 1 Bsm 1 0 Feb-06 1 0 0 
Theriault James     1     8     0 1 SS 1 0 Feb-05 0 0 0 
Tiedman David 1             2 1 1 SS 1 1 Apr-06 0 0 0 
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Tonasket Anthoney 1         4     0 1 PH 0 0 Mar-06 0 1 0 
Trahan Randell 1         5     1 1 Bsm 2 0 Feb-05 0 1 1 
Trueblood Charity   1       3     0 0 Bsm 1 0 Dec-05 0 0 0 
Turner Jo 1         6     1 0 Efmb 0 1 Jan-07 1 0 0 
Vanlandingha
m John 1             3 1 1 SS 1 1 Nov-04 0 0 0 
Vega Sarah         1 5     0 0 CGCM 0 0 Feb-06 0 0 0 
Veresko Paul   1       8     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Dec-04 0 0 0 
Viggiani Anthony       1   6     0 1 NC 1 0 Jun-04 1 0 0 
Ward Stephen 1         7     0 1 Bsm 1 1 Nov-07 1 1 0 
Warrick Clinton 1         4     0 1 SS 1 1 Sep-06 0 1 0 
Whalen Kevin   1       6     1 1 SS 1 0 Jul-03 1 1 0 
whitiker leticia   1       8     1 0 Bsm 0 0 Jul-03 1 0 0 
white william 1           4   1 1 DFC 1 0 Dec-06 0 0 0 
wilzcek jermey 1         6     0 1 SS 1 0 Mar-06 0 0 0 
winegar chadwick       1   5     0 1 NAM 1 0 Nov-05 0 0 0 
winski brian 1             5 0 1 Bsm 1 0 Sep-06 0 0 0 
witkowski james 1         5     1 1 SS 1 0 Oct-05 0 1 1 
wollick keith   1           3 0 1 DFC 1 0 Jul-05 1 0 0 
workman jereiamh       1   5     0 1 NC 1 0 Dec-04 1 0 0 
worthan ryan 1             4 0 1 SS 1 0 Sep-03 1 0 0 
wothingham nicholas   1       3     0 1 Bsm 0 0 Jun-06 0 0 0 
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zanders Michael 1           4   0 1 Bsm 0 0 Apr-06 0 0 0 
zapien Johnathan 1         6     0 1 
German 
Medal 1 0 Sep-06 1 0 0 
zedwick Matthew 1         6     1 1 SS 1 0 Jun-04 0 0 0 









DoD Heroes Database Statistics 
 
53.23% 20.43%
16.13% E‐3 8 6.15% O‐1 1 2.04%
10.22% 21.51% E‐4 23 17.69% O‐2 10 20.41%
19.35% 78.49% E‐5 36 27.69% O‐3 16 32.65%
1.08% E‐6 32 24.62% O‐4 17 34.69%
29.57% E‐7 13 10.00% O‐5 2 4.08%
93.01% 10.75% E‐8 15 11.54% O‐6 3 6.12%
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APPENDIX Y. 
Selected Verbatim Comments from Convenience Sample 
 
Infantry Officer, four years of service: I like the idea of a host nation award, but I 
believe the key is the set requirements for awarding. The host nation award should be 
specific to COIN and not general to all Soldiers participating in the conflict. 
 
Field Artillery Officer, twenty years of service: I like the “Combat Advisor” tab 
idea put forward by John Nagle’s article about the Advisor corps for the Center for a New 
American Security. Not sure that is the best idea but something like that could be in 
order.  
 
Infantry Officer, four years of service: COIN operations are inherently more 
difficult to evaluate for they are not as easily quantifiable. For instance, is the security 
breakdown in Mosul in 2004 a reflection of poor COIN or simply insurgents moving 
from another AO. Even when successful, an effective COIN can not be easily evaluated 
against the counterfactual scenario i.e. what would have happened in the absence of these 
actions? Ultimately, COIN awards will be awarded on a qualitative basis. This is 
problematic for the current awards given are supposed to meet more stringent criteria yet 
are often processed based on the willingness of a commander to take the time to submit 
an award or to embellish certain facts in order to make sure his guys “get theirs”. Despite 
these difficulties, the “best practices” idea is probably the best way to recognize bright 
commanders. For more junior Soldiers, an ARCOM or a new award developed for this 
purpose would most likely suffice. Personally, I think the award system is more broken 
than functioning. There is a need for a centralized clearinghouse for awards to serve as 
effective arbiters of awards. 
 
Special Forces Officer, 13 years of service: Our current awards system recognizes 
merit (or service), achievement, and valor, all of which our soldiers display in COIN. I 
personally do not feel that creating a COIN specific award, or altering the awarding 
system, would change the thoughts, beliefs, or procedures of the senior military leaders 
who approve the awards. It will still boil down to merit (service), achievement, and valor. 
These same criteria apply in peace and combat. I do think there should be a combat 
equivalent of the ARCOM. Currently the lowest combat specific award (it can only be 
earned in combat) for service or achievement is the Bronze Star. Many leaders rightfully 
believe that a BSM warrants a high degree of responsibility and service, therefore many 
junior soldiers receive ARCOMs for 12 month tours in a combat zone. An ARCOM is a 
respectable award, but we have all seen individuals receive that same award for hosting a 
commanders ball. This lessens the award of an ARCOM for combat service. The BSM is 




Infantry Officer, 12 years of service: I see two main obstacles for recognizing 
achievement/service for COIN operations – history and expectations. US history has been 
written primarily thru conventional wars. When a new Soldier arrives to his unit, he reads 
the citations of bravery and valor posted on the hallways of previous Medal of Honor 
Recipients - most fought during Vietnam, WW II, WW I, the Indian Wars, and most of 
these individuals killed a lot of bad guys. Since COIN is the exception to our history, we 
don’t have much to compare today’s accomplishments with. So the expectation is that 
you must kill a lot to get recognized – doesn’t fit with COIN. When Commander’s 
understand that you don’t need to kill in order to win a COIN fight, and more emphasis is 
placed on IO /FID/Nation Building, then recognition should shift from a body count to 
other COIN types of accomplishments.  
We have more types of awards in our toolkit than we need. Adding more just 
focused on COIN would be a mistake – we start looking like Mexican generals of old. 
The solution in my opinion lies with the intermediate and approval authorities (all 
Commanders) – they have to understand that significant achievements in COIN can be 
just as effective as storming an enemy pillbox. 
 
Infantry Officer, 12 years of service: I don’t think you can use current awards to 
reward COIN achievements because in the approval process leadership will compare 
apples to oranges and downgrade COIN achievements in the face of conventional combat 
actions / achievements. 
 
Special Forces Officer, 18 years of service: Ideally a COIN award could be 
established, but I don’t think it is feasible, seeing that the Army cannot come up with an 
award for retirees that falls between the MSM and the LOM. I think something 
campaign-related and COIN specific like the suggested award device would be a good 
incentive for soldiers of all ranks to recognize their COIN contribution, I think the device 
would be feasible, and give recognition in addition to singular achievement and tour 
awards currently in the system. A feedback mechanism that can be used to quantitatively 
(somewhat) measure COIN performance, is applying the ARTEP concept to training 
indigenous forces. The measures of performance provided by existing MTPs provide a 
good indicator of how indigenous forces are progressing through their training, and can 
even be applied to evaluating ops. I saw this used by the BATT ODAs training IZ Bns in 
northern IZ, and it was effective as a feedback mechanism. It can be used similarly for 
quantifying awards for the trainer/advisors. It is tough to use foreign awards because of 
the inconsistency of standards when depending on indig staffs and leaders to determine 
who gets the awards. Unit awards work better here I think, but I like the idea. I know how 
coveted foreign jump wings are, and if there is a way to apply it fairly, it would be a good 
incentive. 
 
Armor Officer, 13 years if service: The specific award (i.e. ARCOM etc) can still 
be used in a COIN environment, but it requires the writer (and more importantly, the 
approver) to understand what to write. While we have traditionally focused on 
quantifiable actions, there is no reason the write up cannot say “for fostering a long-term 
relationship with the leaders of the xxx village, which assisted in reinstituting basic 
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services and increasing security in the area” This same concept can be applied to the end 
of tour award, which will have a longer-focus. (Also – do we NEED continual ‘atta-boy’ 
awards while deployed? Just because we give valor awards for extraordinary actions in 
combat doesn’t mean we need them for doing COIN) 
 
Civil-Affairs Officer, 15 years of service: Re-educate our leadership to understand 
that rank does not equate to level of award, the act or acts alone should…With the current 
mindset in which we are operating I feel any new award would simply fall victim to the 
same stupid practices we see under the current one. A COIN award could, however, fill 
the void for those operations currently taking place that do not quite fall under war or 
peace as in Africa, South America, etc., but most certainly fall under COIN.  
 
Special Forces Officer, 12 years of service: I am generally against the creation of 
new awards. What we already have will work if the “award culture” is correct. In SF we 
routinely include COIN achievements in awards- any of the bellow examples would be 
part of an award citation. 
 
Special Forces Officer, 19 years of service: Soldiers serving in COIN 
environments (PI) are not always eligible for combat awards even though they receive 
combat pay and benefits. I saw more combat in the PI than I saw in AF. If at any time a 
soldier is in a hostile fire zone, combat awards should not be a question. 
 
Armor Officer, 16 years: The irony in this is that an area of operations where 
COIN operations have been successful there will be limited to no major direct action or 
kinetic operations thus limiting the number of high level individual awards. Conversely, 
areas where COIN has been unsuccessful, there will likely be an increase in the number 
and scope of combat operations thus increasing the individual valorous or achievement 
awards. The problem set as I understand it then, is how to reward Soldiers and units in 
successful COIN operations that appear peaceful because limited or no combat operations 
have taken place. The onus remains on the commander, and higher level commands to 
recognize individual and unit achievements, to see ‘through’ the relative level of calm 
and peace in a COIN environment and recognize subordinates for their accomplishment, 
regardless of the lack of fireworks displayed. The concept of COIN specific awards is 
revolutionary, and perhaps not enduring. In full spectrum operations you may have a high 
intensity combat operation going on in one end of the city, while on the other half, the 
town is being pacified through expert application of the COIN principles. A single 
commander controlling both sectors would have a difficult time implementing a new 
system with the old. A new system of COIN specific awards would be difficult to work 
through and may have the unintended consequence of establishing an informal hierarchal 
awards structure that minimizes the importance of COIN awards (my BSM V is better 
than your COIN award because I got shot at) thus nullifying it’s intended effect-
recognizing excellence. In this, the standard array of awards lend themselves well to the 
COIN environment. Again, it’s on the commander to make the right decisions in the 
awards process. But of course, I believe the across the Army there needs to be a greater 
understanding of COIN and the difficulty in executing it properly. 
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-Individual demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of the local population, by 
defusing a potential violent clash 
 
-Individual, leader or staff officer, advisor, creates and maintains a comprehensive 
database capturing pertinent information concerning the area of operations to include 
population demographics, key indigenous personnel in the AO, partner forces level of 
training and proficiency (to include bio’s of key leaders), enemy key personnel, TTPs, 
networks and ties to the population, and capabilities to facilitate continuity of new and 
replacement personnel. 
 
-Individuals clear understanding of using Information Operations led to a 10% shift in 
favorable impressions of coalition forces within group X 
 
-Leader successfully attacks an enemy strategy: if he tries to capture/recapture the favor 
of a certain segment of the population the unit is able to co-opt the segment against the 
enemy 
 
-Individual does an exceptional job building, maintaining inter-agency operations within 
your AO 
 
-Individual has shown a superior ability to work with host nation leaders, increasing the 
level of access and understanding US forces have of the AO. 
 
-Host nation unit individual is working with demonstrates marked improvement in its 
capabilities 
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